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Abstract
This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determined
by test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitive
ability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitive
ability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data, between high test scores
and economic success may be partially caused by favorable personality traits. To demonstrate
these points, I use the coding speed test that was administered without incentives to National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) participants. I suggest that due to its simplicity
its scores may especially depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. I show that controlling
for conventional measures of cognitive skills, the coding speed scores are correlated with future
earnings of male NLSY participants. Moreover, the coding speed scores of highly motivated,
though less educated, population (potential enlists to the armed forces) are higher than NLSY
participants' scores. I then use controlled experiments to show that when no performance-based
incentives are provided, participants' characteristics, but not their cognitive skills, a®ect e®ort
invested in the coding speed test. Thus, participants with the same ability (measured by their
scores on an incentivized test) have signi¯cantly di®erent scores on tests without performance-
based incentives.
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11 Introduction
The inferences regarding test scores and their associations with economic outcomes and cognitive
skills of individuals and groups are mostly based on tests administered without performance-based
incentives to survey participants. Thus, there is no a-priori reason to assume that survey partici-
pants try their best to solve the test. As a result, the issue of e®ort, or motivation, may be crucial
to the interpretation of the empirical ¯ndings. Speci¯cally, on tests without performance-based
incentives higher scores do not generally imply higher cognitive ability. Instead, higher scores may
be caused by higher test-taking motivation, associated with personality traits. Therefore, it is pos-
sible that individuals that look less able are actually less motivated and that associations between
higher scores and economic success should also be attributed to favorable personality traits.
To demonstrate these points, I identify a test that due to its simplicity, its scores may especially
depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. This test was administered without performance-
based incentives to participants in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) and
with incentives to potential recruits to the armed forces. The highly motivated, though less edu-
cated, population (potential enlists) scored higher on this test than the less motivated one (NLSY).
Furthermore, I show that its non-incentivized scores, are positively related to future income of NLSY
participants, controlling for conventional measures of cognitive skills. To gather de¯nite evidence,
I conducted controlled experiments in which this test was taken with and without performance-
based incentives. I ¯nd heterogeneous responses to the lack of incentives, relating to individual
characteristics but not to cognitive skills. Roughly a third of the participants, though as able as
their fellow participants (as their scores on an incentivized test indicate), were less motivated and
invested less e®ort when performance-based incentives were not provided. As a result they scored
signi¯cantly worse on tests without incentives.
Economic theory indicates that if costly e®ort is needed to solve a test, then without performance-
based incentives test-takers invest the lowest e®ort possible. However, survey participants' rarely
score zero on unincentivized tests. This may be due to psychic bene¯ts they gain from high scores.
If high ability test-takers have lower costs of e®ort and/or ¯nd high test scores more rewarding,
then they will have higher test scores than low ability ones. As a result, test scores will always
provide a correct ranking according to ability. However, if the most able test-takers do not gain
the highest psychic bene¯ts from having high scores, then test scores, in general, will not provide
correct ranking according to ability. In this case, low test scores will not imply that individuals or
groups have low cognitive ability.1 Moreover, if test-taking motivation relates to personality traits
then these traits may also be a source of associations between test scores and economic outcomes.
A likely candidate to a®ect both test-taking motivation and economic success is conscientiousness.2
1This intuition is modeled in section 6, below.
2Conscientiousness is a personality trait that has been repeatedly found to be positively correlated with labor
market outcomes (see for example, Judge et al., 1999). I discuss it in detail below.
2To investigate the relationship between test-taking motivation, cognitive ability, and test score,
ideally, one would like to have both low- and high-stakes scores for each individual for a given test.
With this data, the comparison between individual rankings according to their low- and high-stakes
test scores can answer the question whether test-taking motivation relates to cognitive skills. If in
addition data regarding economic outcomes is available, then one could investigate the importance
to outcomes of personality traits, associated with test-taking motivation, relative to the importance
of cognitive skills. However, to the best of my knowledge, there exists no such data. Instead, I
utilize three di®erent data sources: The NLSY, test scores of potential recruits to the armed forces,
and experimental data. Each is used to provide evidence regarding a part of the puzzle.
As the ideal data is not available, selecting a proper test may be crucial. While all low-stakes
test score may be a®ected by test-taking motivation, the e®ect may be more pronounced, and thus
easier to detect, in tests which do not require specialized knowledge. The coding speed test may
ful¯ll this requirement. The task in the coding speed test is to match words with four digit numbers
(an example of the test is given in Figure 1). To ¯nd out which word matches to which number,
test-takers need to look at the key, in which the associations between each four digit number and
each word is given. As the knowledge necessary to answer the coding speed test is minimal, it is
likely that e®ort is the main contributor to high scores. Still, the time allotted to the coding speed
test is short, and thus it could be that its scores measure cognitive ability.3
The coding speed test is part of the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).4
Participants in the NLSY were not provided with direct performance-based incentives to take the
ABSVAB. Thus, for them it is a low-stakes test. The ASVAB also serves as the \entrance exam"
to the armed forces. As such, it is a high-stakes test for prospective enlists. NLSY participants,
though more educated, scored worse on the coding speed test than potential recruits. This is
expected if test-taking motivation is important for the coding speed test.
I use the NLSY data to show that the coding speed test, though simple, when administered
without performance-based incentives, measure traits highly valued in the market. I ¯nd that con-
trolling for conventional measures of cognitive skills (the Armed Forces Quali¯cation Test (AFQT)
scores),5 the coding speed scores are signi¯cantly associated with earnings of male NLSY partici-
pants, 23 years after they took the test. While this ¯nding does not ensure that the skills measured
by the coding speed scores are cognitive, I ¯nd that the relationship between the coding speed
scores and earnings follows patterns documented for non-cognitive skills (Segal, 2005, Heckman
et al., 2006). Speci¯cally, I ¯nd that the coding speed scores are relatively more important to
3Using factor analysis Heckman (1995) and Cawley et al. (1997) have shown that the coding speed test and the
numerical operations test, which includes very simple arithmetic computations, correspond to a di®erent factor than
the other ASVAB tests and that together they are highly correlated with earnings. The authors suggest that these
tests measure \°uid intelligence or problem solving ability" (Heckman, 1995, p. 1105).
4The 10 ASVAB tests are described in Table A1 in Appendix A.
5The AFQT has been widely used as a measure cognitive skills and has been found to be correlated with NLSY
participants' income (see for example, Herrnstein and Murray, 1994, Heckman, 1995, Neal and Johnson, 1996).
3earnings of low educated workers.
The evidence from the NLSY and the comparison to potential recruits suggest that it is possible
that the coding speed scores relate to test-taking motivation and to personality traits associated
with it. To gather conclusive evidence, I conducted a controlled experiments, in which motivation
was induced via the provision of incentives. Subjects in the experiment took the coding speed test
three times. Twice for a ¯xed payment, where the ¯rst version was called \practice" test and the
second \The" test. Monetary performance-based incentives were provided for the third version.
The model implies that the provision of incentives may change subjects' ranking if test-taking
motivation di®ers across subjects. I ¯nd that subjects changed their ranks between the tests. This
rank change is due to subjects' heterogeneous responses to the lack of incentives. Speci¯cally,
participants can be divided into two groups. While the ¯rst group (62% of subjects) consists of
subjects whose own performance did not improve with provision of performance-based incentives,
the performance of participants of the second group improved signi¯cantly. When no performance-
based incentives were provided the test score distribution of the ¯rst group ¯rst order stochastically
dominated the test score distribution of the second one. Thus, subjects of the second group appear
less able. However, subjects of both groups had the same test score distributions when incentives
were provided. Taken together these results suggest that those who performed worse on tests
without incentives invested less e®ort and were unmotivated, though not less able.
Utilizing participants' answers to a psychological survey, I ¯nd that male participants who
invested high e®ort only incentives were provided were less conscientious. In addition, women were
more likely to invest high e®ort even without incentives. Consistent with the experimental results,
I ¯nd no relationship between subjects' e®ort choices in the experiment and their SAT scores.
Taken together, the evidence in this paper suggests that due to the simplicity of the coding
speed test, its scores are highly correlated with test-taking motivation when no performance-based
incentives are provided. This is the ¯rst paper demonstrating that, at least for the coding speed
test, higher test scores on tests without incentives do not imply higher cognitive ability. Instead,
when incentives are not provided, individual characteristics a®ect e®ort invested in solving the test.
The relationship between motivation and test scores has been investigated before. While the
working assumption of the psychometric literature seems to be that all test-takers are highly moti-
vated, there is substantial evidence, dating back to the 1900's, that motivation a®ects performance
on tests and may be related to personality traits (for an excellent summary see Revelle (1993)
and citations therein).6 In economics, the evidence obtained through lab and ¯eld experiments
clearly indicates that performance on tests is positively related to (high enough) incentives (see for
example, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, Angrist and Lavy, 2004, Kremer et al., 2005).
This paper also relates to the recent literature investigating the validity of the basic premises of
6The focus of psychologists (and lately of economists) has been on the crowding out e®ects that extrinsic incentives
may have on intrinsic motivation (see for example, Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, Benabou and Tirole, 2003).
4agency theory. Namely, that individuals invest little e®ort unless provided with proper incentives or
monitored.7 This literature suggests that economic theory can predict the behavior of non-negligible
fraction of individuals. For example, Nagin et al. (2005) show that about 40% of employees in a
calling center shirked when they inferred that they are not being monitored. Fehr and Falk (1999)
show experimentally that in response to higher °at wages about 25% of participants always provided
minimal e®ort, while the rest responded by choosing higher e®ort. This paper demonstrates that
these insights are present in a testing situations too.8 Furthermore, it shows that heterogeneous
responses to the lack of performance-based incentives are not driven by di®erences in abilities.
Lastly this paper relates to the literature relating cognitive and non-cognitive skills to earnings
(see for example, Bowles et al., 2001, Persico et al., 2004, Kuhn and Weinberger, 2005, Segal,
2005, Heckman et al., 2006). Rather than looking for a proxy for non-cognitive skills, I focus on
the non-cognitive component of test scores available in surveys, which are the main measure of
cognitive skills. I argue that the lack of performance-based incentives allows personality traits,
i.e., non-cognitive skills, to a®ect test scores.9 While the regression results using the NLSY data
only provide suggestive evidence on the relationship between test-taking motivation and personality
traits, the experimental results provide a direct one.
Next I brie°y describe the NLSY data and discuss in detail the tests used in the analysis. I
proceed by investigating the relationship between the coding speed scores and earnings in NLSY
data and then provide the comparison to potential recruits. To highlight how test-taking motivation
can be detected, I introduce the model. Lastly, I describe the experiment, its results and conclude.
2 Data
The analysis in Section 4 relies on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY). A
nationally representative sample of over 12,000 individuals that were ¯rst surveyed in 1979, when
they were between the ages of 15 and 22, and then re-surveyed annually until 1994 and biannually
afterwards. For the purposes of this paper, this source is exceptional in combining detailed labor
market data with a battery of tests, which is also administered to a non-survey population. Since the
NLSY is a well-known survey, this section will focus on aspects particular to this paper, namely, the
tests administered to NLSY participants. Due to its main role in the analysis the coding speed test
is described in the next section. Details regarding the sample restriction and variable construction
7While not directly related to this paper, there is a growing literature in economics investigating how other-
regarding preferences alters individual behavior (for an excellent summary see Fehr and Schmidt, 2003).
8This, is documented in the literature in psychology (Revelle, 1993). In economics, this e®ect can ¯rst be found
in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) where the e®ect of incentives was to move some participant scores away (when
incentives were high) and toward (when incentives were low) zero scores on the test. Lately, Borghans et al. (2008)
show that when given IQ questions some participants respond to incentives mainly by investing more time in answering
questions while others do not. The authors relate this response to incentives to personality traits.
9Recently several studies have shown that test scores correlates with personality traits and preferences parameters
(Benjamin et al., 2005, Borghans et al., 2008, Dohmen et al., 2008).
5can be found in Section A1 of Appendix A. The military data is described in Section 5 and in
Section A2 of Appendix A. The experimental data is described in Section 7.
2.1 The Tests Used in the Analysis
The ASVAB - The ASVAB is a battery of 10 tests, described in Table A1 in Appendix A. It
serves as the screening and sorting exam to the armed forces. As the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) had to establish a national norm for the ASVAB, it had to be administered to a represented
sample of Americans. The DOD and the U.S. Department of Labor decided to utilize the NLSY
sample for this purpose. The administration of the ASVAB to the NLSY participants took place
between June and October of 1980. Participants in the NLSY were paid $50 for completing the
test.10 However, no direct performance-based incentives were provided.11 Thus, for the NLSY
participants the ASVAB is a low-stakes test.
AFQT - The Armed Forces Quali¯cation Test (AFQT) scores are created by adding the scores of
four of the ASVAB subtests (word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and
mathematics knowledge). The AFQT is the most commonly used test in studies using the NLSY
data set (see for example, Herrnstein and Murray, 1994, Heckman, 1995, Neal and Johnson, 1996).
3 The Coding Speed Test
The coding speed test is central to the analysis. Thus, I start by describing the test and the reasons
why it has been chosen. The instructions and an example of the questions asked in the coding speed
test are given in Figure 1. The coding speed test is one of the ASVAB subtests.12 The task in the
coding speed test is to match words with four digit numbers. To ¯gure out which word matches to
which number, test-takers need to look at the key, in which the association between each word and
a four digit number is given. Each key includes 10 words and their respective codes. The questions
associated with a speci¯c key consist of 7 words taken from the key. In each of the questions,
test-takers are asked to ¯nd the correct code from ¯ve possible codes.13 The NLSY participants
took a paper and pencil version of the test that lasts for 7 minutes and consists of 84 questions.
Ideally, in order to test whether test takers di®er in their motivation to take a test, we would like
to ¯nd a test, such that all test takers have the knowledge necessary to correctly answer all questions,
if they so desire. The coding speed test seems a likely candidate to ful¯ll this requirement. It seems
10\...The decision to pay an honorarium was based on the experience in similar studies, which indicated that an
incentive would be needed to get young people to travel up to an hour to a testing center, spend three hours or more
taking the test, and then travel home..." (Department of Defense (1982), p. 12).
11Some indirect incentives may have been provided by promising participants that at a future date they will get
their own test scores, which may help them makes plans for their future.
12The coding speed test was originally part of the ASVAB to help sort recruits to clerical positions and to help
detect cheating on the AFQT (see Maier and Sims, 1983, Maier and Hiatt, 1986).
13Note that even though the name coding speed may suggest complicated reasoning task, unlike IQ tests, test
takers do not need to infer the relationships between the words and the numbers, as they are given in the key.
6likely that everyone that knows how to read has the knowledge to correctly answer questions on the
test. Therefore, due to its simplicity, test-taking motivation may play a large role in determining
its scores.14 Nevertheless, as the time allotted to the coding speed test is short, it is possible
that not all test-takers are able to achieve a perfect score. Thus, the coding speed test may also
measure cognitive ability related to speed. This ability may be di®erent than the one that is
being measured by the AFQT. For example Heckman (1995) suggests that the coding speed (and
numerical operation) tests measure °uid intelligence or problem solving ability.
4 The NLSY Data: The Coding Speed Scores and Earnings
In this section, I present evidence that the coding speed scores are correlated with earnings of the
NLSY participants. The results presented in this section are for men only, as a full treatment of the
selection problem associated with female earnings is beyond the scope of this paper.15 The results
for women are very similar to ones for men. For completeness the basic means and regressions
results for women are presented in Tables B1 and B2, respectively, in Appendix B.
The coding speed test seems to be a very simple test. Nevertheless, its scores are highly
correlated with future economic success of NLSY participants. Table 1 presents the means of the
key variables, breaking them down by a coding speed dummy for men.16 The coding speed dummy
is set to zero for all men whose coding speed scores were lower than the mean (47% overall),
and is set to one otherwise. The story that will be told in detail below shows up in the simple
means. More than two decades after NLSY participants took the ASVAB test, men who had low
coding speed scores had lower educational attainment and are less likely to be employed in 2003.
Moreover, conditional on being employed, those who had low coding speed scores earn on average
35% less than those who had high scores. While the coding speed scores seem to be correlated
14The ASVAB contains another test that may seem appropriate to use: the Numerical Operation test. This test
consists of 50 simple algebraic questions (e.g., 2+2=?, 16/8=?, etc.) and lasts 3 minutes. However, it is possible,
that some individuals may not have the knowledge necessary to correctly solve these questions. A more serious
concern is that individuals with high math skills may invest higher e®ort in solving the numerical operations test
than individuals with low math skills. Thus, the scores may include a larger component of knowledge than the content
of the questions may suggest. Psychologists investigating motivation (or the lack of it) suggest that its e®ects are
more pronounced the longer the task lasts (see Revelle, 1993). The coding speed test is more than twice as long as
the numerical operation test, suggesting that the e®ects of test-taking motivation may be more pronounced for it.
In addition, while 16% of NLSY participants correctly solved at least 90% of the numerical operation questions, the
corresponding number for the coding speed test is 1%. Thus, the coding speed test may serve as a better measure
since its scores range is less restricted.
15Several papers had cautioned against inferences made from female earnings regressions to o®ered wages due to
severe selection problems. For example, Neal (2004) have shown that while non-working white women tend to be
mothers supported by their spouse, non-working black women tend to be single mother receiving government aid.
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2005) suggest that selection is an important determinant in female wages.
16As is discussed in Appendix A, the AFQT and the coding speed scores have been adjusted for school-year cohort,
where a school year-cohort includes all the individuals that were born between October 1
st of one year and September
30
th of the following one. The residuals from the regressions of AFQT and the coding speed scores on school-year
cohort indicators were then normalized to have a weighted mean zero and standard deviation one, using the ASVAB
sampling weights. In the regressions that follow, the sample is restricted to include the three youngest cohorts.
7with economic outcomes, the simple means presented above do not take other factors into account.
Below, I investigate whether the coding speed scores are associated with labor market outcomes
once conventional measures of cognitive ability and educational attainment are accounted for.
4.1 The Basic Regression Results
The model estimated in this section is of the form ln(earnings)i = ¯ +¯AFQTAFQTi +¯CSCSi +
¯XXi+"i, where i indexes individuals, earnings are earnings in 2003, AFQT are the AFQT scores,
CS are the coding speed scores, X denote individual characteristics, and " is an error term.
Before turning to the regression results it is useful to discuss how to interpret di®erent possible
results. There are two distinct cases to consider. 1. The coding speed scores proxy for traits valued
in the market and di®erent from the one measured by the AFQT. These traits may be cognitive
skills (possibly °uid intelligence) or the personality traits associated with test-taking motivation.
In either case, controlling for the AFQT scores, ¯CS should be positive.
2. Earnings are only a function of cognitive skills (presumably measured by the AFQT). How-
ever, as the AFQT was administered without performance-based incentives, for the NLSY partici-
pants it is a low-stakes test. Thus, its scores should be a function of cognitive skills and test-taking
motivation. Hence, adding the coding speed scores (that presumably measure test-taking motiva-
tion) to regressions that include the AFQT ones, should increase ¯AFQT. Moreover, ¯CS should be
negative. The intuition is simple. By itself test-taking motivation masks the relationship between
the underlying cognitive skills and the AFQT that supposed to measure them. To see that consider
two individuals having the same AFQT scores but di®erent levels of test-taking motivation. The
one who is more motivated works harder, but nevertheless only manages to solve as many ques-
tions as his fellow participant who works less hard. Thus, the unmotivated participant has higher
cognitive skills. However, this can be inferred only if test-taking motivation is known.17
Table 2 presents the basic regression results. The dependent variable is log of earnings in 2003
of male civilian workers not enrolled in school. In column 1 only age and race dummies serve as
controls. Column 2 adds to the regressions the AFQT scores. In accordance with the literature (see
for example, Neal and Johnson, 1996, 1998), the AFQT scores are highly correlated with earnings,
suggesting that they measure a trait which is highly valued in the market. Column 3 adds to the
regression in column 1 the coding speed scores instead of the AFQT ones. The coding speed scores
are highly correlated themselves with earnings. One standard deviation increase in the coding speed
scores corresponds to an increase of 27.8% in earnings. Thus, the coding speed scores measure a
trait that is positively priced in the labor market. In Column 4 both the AFQT and the coding
speed scores are added to the regressions. The coe±cients on both the coding speed and the AFQT
scores are positive and highly signi¯cant (the F-test for whether the two are jointly equal to zero
17A similar argument can be made if the coding speed scores measure speed (in particular reading speed) if the
time allotted to the AFQT is not long enough to allow all individuals to try solving all AFQT questions.
8yields p < 0.01). Controlling for the AFQT scores, one standard deviation increase in the coding
speed scores is associated with an increase 9.6% in earnings.
In comparison to columns 2 and 3, the point estimates on both the AFQT and the coding speed
scores in Column 4 are reduced in magnitude, indicating that they share a common component. This
common component may be test-taking motivation as both were administered without performance-
based incentives. Alternatively, it may be reading ability. The AFQT includes two verbal parts
one of which (reading comprehension) was introduced to \...help solve the problem of assessing
literacy" (Maier and Sims, 1986, p. A-9). Thus, it is possible that the coding speed scores correlates
with earnings only because the regressions reported in Table 2 regressions the math and verbal parts
of the AFQT are not allowed to vary independently. To investigate this question, Table 3 repeats
the regressions in columns 2 to 5 of Table 2 using the 4 tests separately. Table 3 clearly indicates
that none of the main ¯ndings is di®erent; the coding speed scores are still signi¯cantly correlated
with earnings and so is the sum of the 4 tests.18 Thus, the results in Table 3 suggest that the
relationship between the coding speed scores and earnings do not stem from reading ability alone.
Of particular interest is whether the relationships between both test scores and earnings relate
to educational attainment. Once years of schooling completed are controlled for, in Column 5, the
coe±cient on the coding speed scores are (insigni¯cantly) reduced by 30%. However, the association
between the coding speed scores and earnings is still economically large and statistically signi¯cant.
One standard deviation increase in coding speed scores is associated with an increase of 6.6% in
earnings. The association between the AFQT scores and earnings is signi¯cantly reduced by a
larger amount - 66%. Nevertheless, the association between the AFQT scores and earnings are
still signi¯cant. Interestingly, the coe±cients on the AFQT and the coding scores are no longer
signi¯cantly di®erent than one another (F-test for the equality of the coe±cients yields p = 0.27).
4.2 For Whom Do the Coding Speed Scores Matter the Most?
The results in Table 2 suggest that the coding speed scores are signi¯cantly associated with earnings.
They are associated with earnings by themselves and after controlling for conventional measures
of cognitive skills like the AFQT scores and educational attainment. This suggests that the coding
speed scores measure skills which are positively priced in the labor market. In light of the discussion
in the beginning of the section, we can conclude that the coding speed scores either proxy for
cognitive skills (di®erent than the ones measured by the AFQT) or for personality traits that relate
to test-taking motivation. Below, I try to shed light on what skills the coding speed scores may
18The four tests are highly correlated with one another, thus caution should be taken when trying to draw any
conclusions regarding the patterns of their correlations with earnings. Nevertheless, a few comments may be war-
ranted. The comparison between columns 2 and 3 suggests that the coe±cients on the verbal parts of the AFQT are
reduced by larger fraction once the coding speed scores are added to the regressions. However, these reductions are
insigni¯cant both individually and jointly. Actually the correlations between the coding speed scores and earnings
are reduced by the largest amount when the math and not the verbal parts of the AFQT are added to the regressions.
9measure. The evidence presented below is suggestive. The interpretation relies on what is already
known about the relationship between cognitive and non-cognitive skills and earnings.
If the AFQT measure cognitive ability we may expect that its scores will be more important
for earnings of highly educated individuals. Similarly, if the coding speed scores measure problem
solving ability or °uid intelligence as was suggested by Heckman (1995), then it also seems likely
that they would be more important for earnings of individuals who are highly educated. The last
3 columns of Table 2 investigate this issue. In column 6, I allow for the coe±cients on the AFQT
scores to vary between those who at least graduated from college and those who did not. The
regression results are clear; the association between AFQT scores and earnings is much stronger for
those individuals who got at least a bachelor degree than for the ones who did not (F-test for the
equality of the two coe±cients yields p = 0.026). This is not a result of controlling for the coding
scores, as can clearly be seen in column 8.19 In contrast, the coding speed scores are related to
earnings for individuals of all education levels. In Column 7, I allow the coe±cients on coding speed
scores to vary between workers who at least graduated from college and those who did not. The
two coe±cients on the coding speed scores are identical (F-test for the equality of the coe±cients
yielded p = 0.998), though the one for highly educated workers is imprecisely estimated.
The relative importance of the traits measured by the coding speed scores vary across education
groups. For individuals who at least graduated from college, the AFQT scores are almost 4 times as
important to earnings as are the coding speed scores (F-test for the equality of the coe±cient yields
p = 0.038 for Column 7 speci¯cation). In contrast, for individuals with lower education levels, the
AFQT and the coding speed scores are as important to earnings (F-test for the equality of the
coe±cient yields p = 0.669 for Column 7 speci¯cation). This suggests that the skills that are being
measured by the coding speed test are relatively less important for earnings of highly educated
workers. The evidence in the literature suggests that non-cognitive skills are more important to
low educated people (see Segal, 2005, Heckman et al., 2006).
To further shed light on what the coding speed may measure, I examine workers in di®erent
occupations. An estimation of an occupational choice model is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, I look at wages of individuals of di®erent occupations. Here I look at two extreme examples,
production workers, working with machines, and managers and professional. Table 4 describe the
results from regressions where the dependent variable is the log of wages in 2004 for the job the
workers reported.20;21 The ¯rst two columns depict the regressions results for production workers
with at most high school diploma and the last 2 columns present the regressions results for mangers
19F-test for the equality of the two coe±cients on the AFQT scores in Column 8 yields p = 0.035.
20Since occupation is only reported for jobs held in 2004, I use here the respective wage in 2004 for job number 1.
The sample was restricted to include all civilian workers not enrolled in school reporting positive wages in 2004 on
job number 1, for whom dada on schooling in 2004 is available. See section A1 in Appendix A for details.
21For completion, the basic regression results when ln(wage2004) is the dependent variable are reported in Table
B3 in Appendix B.
10and professional with at least an Associate of Arts degree. As can be clearly seen in Table 4, for
production workers coding speed scores are the only test scores that relate to wages. In contrast,
for managers and professional only the AFQT scores relate to wages. It seems reasonable to assume
that production workers are required to do what is mostly a repetitive job, which is usually not very
mentally demanding. A production worker that can be trusted to do his job even without being
constantly monitored and that is dependable (e.g., comes on time and is not frequently absent)
may be more valuable than one that has great mental skills. As far as the coding speed scores
measure docility it may be the case that this is not the most important trait for managers and
professionals, maybe just the contrary. This however does not mean that personality traits are not
important for managers. In the regressions for managers and professionals the explanatory power
of both the AFQT and coding speed scores is very low, in particular in comparison to the respective
regressions for production workers. This may suggest that at least for managers and professionals
some crucial explanatory variables are missing.
4.3 The Coding Speed Scores and Family and School Characteristics
In this section I discuss the relationships between the coding speed scores and family and school
characteristics. The purpose is two folded: To investigate the relationship between the coding speed
scores and family and schools characteristics. But also, to ¯nd out what can be learned from the
comparison between these relationship for the AFQT and coding speed scores.
Table 5 presents the coe±cients from regressions of the cohort-adjusted AFQT (columns 1-
3) and coding speed scores (columns 4-6) on family and school characteristics.22 In columns 1
and 3 only family characteristics are used as explanatory variables. Family characteristics are
related to both the AFQT and the coding speed scores. Thus, higher educated parents, working in
(probably) high paying jobs, fewer siblings, and reading material at home are statistically signi¯cant
and economically meaningful predictors of the AFQT and the coding speed scores. The di®erence
is in their explanatory power. While family characteristics explains almost 40% of the variation in
the AFQT scores, they only explain about 20% of the variation in the coding speed scores.
In the remaining columns of Table 5 schools characteristics are added to the regressions. The
variables describing school characteristics are taken from the school survey in the NLSY. Since many
schools did not respond, the sample size is substantially decreased. Moreover, the racial/ethnic
composition of the sample is somewhat changed, the restricted sample includes 20% more black men
and 17% more Hispanic men. Thus the results reported for the restricted sample may not represent
22The family background characteristics used in the Tables are almost identical to the one used by Neal and
Johnson (1996) to explore the relationships between AFQT and family characteristics. In part, the use of the same
variables as in Neal and Johnson (1996) is to demonstrate that the year-cohort adjustment done to the AFQT and
the coding speed scores have no signi¯cant bearing on the results. There are two additional variables included here,
participants' age in 1980 and an indicator equals to one if participants did not live with both his biological parents
at age 14. Age is added to the regressions since the normalization used for the AFQT and the coding speed scores
does not correspond one to one to participants' year of birth. This variable is always insigni¯cant in the regressions.
11the unrestricted one. Therefore, columns 2 and 5 in the table repeat the regressions reported
in columns 1 and 3 for the restricted sample. While the coe±cients are somewhat di®erent the
qualitative relationship between both test scores and family background characteristics remains the
same. Columns 3 and 6 clearly display that lower student/teacher ratio, less dropouts and teacher
turnover are positively associated with an increase in both the AFQT and the coding speed scores.
Again, we see that these variables explain more than twice the variations in the AFQT scores than in
the coding speed ones. These results are consistent with the ¯ndings in Segal (forthcoming), where
family and school characteristics seem to explain substantial part of the variation in achievement
test scores, but not in non-cognitive skills.
5 Indirect Evidence from the Armed Forces
The results in the last section imply that the coding speed scores measure traits positively priced in
the market and di®erent than the ones measured by the AFQT. Moreover, the results are consistent
with the interpretation that the coding speed scores measure non-cognitive skills associated with
test-taking motivation. Next I provide indirect evidence that the on the test day, the coding speed
scores relate to test-taking motivation. If the lack of performance-based incentives results in lower
test scores, then higher test scores are expected when the same test is administered to highly
motivated population, everything else equal. Moreover, if test-taking motivation is particularly
important for the coding speed scores then the e®ect should be more pronounced for this test.
As the ASVAB is the screening and sorting exam for potential enlists to the armed forces, this
hypothesis can be tested, by comparing the scores of the NLSY participants and potential recruits,
who should have the incentives to do well on the ASVAB. However, as potential recruits are less
educated and more racially diverse population than the NLSY participants, this is not a perfect
test. Nevertheless, this comparison may serve as an indication whether the e®ect exists.
When establishing the national norm for the ASVAB, Maier and Sims (1983) ¯rst discovered
the problems in comparing the ASVAB scores between potential recruits to the armed forces and
NLSY participants of comparable ages (i.e., born before 1/1/1963). Speci¯cally, Maier and Sims
(1983) show that while potential recruits score higher on the speeded tests (i.e., coding speed and
numerical operations tests) than the NLSY participants, they did worse on any other test.23 The
latter part was expected since the NLSY participants were more educated than potential recruits
(Maier and Hiatt, 1986).24 The former part was not. Maier and Hiatt (1986) suggest that the
gaps on the speeded tests are the result of \test taking strategies" among which they count: \work
as fast as possible" and \keep your attention focused on the problem" (Maier and Hiatt, 1986,
p. 5). They add: \...The extent to which all applicants use the same test-taking strategies in not
23The possible solutions suggested by military researchers are discussed in detail in Section A2 of Appendix A.
24It is not clear, though, if the NLSY participants scored as high as can be expected given their education level.
12known. What is known is that the 1980 Youth Population generally did not know or follow these
strategies..." (Maier and Hiatt, 1986, pp. 5-6). It seems unlikely that the NLSY participants did
not know these strategies. However, they may not cared enough to follow them.
Unfortunately, none of the above mentioned sources provide the raw test score distributions of
potential recruits. However, using the information provided in Maier and Hiatt (1986, Appendix
A, pp. A1-A10), I was able to reconstruct the coding speed score distribution for the 1984 male
applicants for enlistment (IOT&E 1984).25 Figure 2 presents the cumulative coding speed scores
for 3 groups of males: NLSY civilian sample born before 1/1/1963, NLSY military sample, and the
IOT&E 1984 sample. Figure 2 clearly displays that the NLSY civilian population has the lowest
test scores, in particular for the lower 80% of the test score distribution.26 If indeed the coding
speed scores measure e®ort this is exactly what we would have expected if the potential recruits
are highly motivated to take the ASVAB while (not all) the NLSY participants are.
Thus, the comparison between potential recruits to the armed forces and the NLSY participants
provides indirect evidence that the coding speed scores may be highly related to motivation to take
the ASVAB. However, there may be other possible explanations to account for the di®erences
between the two populations. Therefore, in order to gather direct evidence that indeed motivation
plays an important role in determining the coding speed scores I turn to the controlled experiment.
6 The Model
In this section I model how individual di®erences in test-taking motivation may a®ect their test
scores. I start with the case in which individuals di®er only in their skills. I then extend the model to
include individual di®erences in test-taking motivation. The main purpose is to understand under
what conditions individuals' ranking according to their test scores corresponds to their ranking
according to their skills. This will allow to derive testable predictions that in turn will allow for
detection of test-taking motivation in the experiment, if it exists.
6.1 The Basic Model
Agents di®er from one another only by their endowment of skills, denoted by x, that a given test
is supposed to measure. The random variable x has a density f(x):
Test scores are being produced using two inputs: skill and e®ort, denoted by e. The production
function of test scores is given by TS(x;e), where test scores are increasing in skills and e®ort, i.e.
TSe > 0 and TSx > 0. I assume further that TSex ¸ 0, i.e., a given increase in e®ort results in
weakly higher test scores for agents with higher skills. Producing test scores is costly. The costs
associated with e®ort, C(x;e), are increasing and convex in e®ort, i.e., Ce > 0 and Cee > 0. It is
25See Section A2 in Appendix A for the construction of this distribution.
26Unfortunately, Maier and Hiatt (1986) do not provide any summary statistics on the IOT&E 1984 sample, so it
is impossible to test whether the two distributions are equal.
13natural to assume that the costs are lower for individuals with higher skills, i.e., Cx < 0, and that
a given increase in e®ort is weakly less costly for agents with higher skills, i.e., Cxe · 0.
If no performance-based incentives are supplied and agents gain no psychic bene¯ts from higher
test scores, then there are no bene¯ts associated with higher test scores. As e®ort is costly, agents in-
vest the minimal e®ort level. In a testing situation the feasible minimal e®ort is solving no question.
However, most survey participants get scores much higher than zero even without performance-
based incentives. Thus, I assume that agents obtain psychic bene¯ts from having higher test scores.
By de¯nition, when agents take a high-stakes test, i.e., a test in which performance-based incentives
(of any kind) are provided, their bene¯ts from higher test scores are not psychic alone. I focus on
the provision of piece rate monetary incentives as this is the relevant case for the experiment.27 In
this case, agents' bene¯ts also include their monetary gains from having higher test scores, given
by M(TS;Á) = A + ÁTS, where A ¸ 0 is a constant, and Á ¸ 0 is the piece rate amount paid for
each correct question (when no monetary incentives are provided Á = 0).
Thus, agents' bene¯ts are given by U(TS;M;Á), where UTS > 0, UM > 0, i.e., agents like to
have more money and higher test scores. I assume further that UTS;TS · 0 and UM;M · 0, and that
agents' bene¯ts are weakly concave in test scores, i.e., d2U
dTS2 =
¡
UTS;TS + 2ÁUTS;M + Á2UM;M
¢
· 0
(this condition is ful¯lled if, for example, agents' bene¯ts are separable in money and test scores).
As usual, an agent with a skill level x chooses an e®ort level, e, to maximize bene¯ts minus costs.
Proposition 1 If agents obtain psychic bene¯ts from higher test scores and/or monetary performance-
based incentives are provided, then the resulting test scores provide a correct ranking according to
agents' skills. Moreover, if the marginal utility is increasing in Á, then an increase in Á would result
in higher test scores and higher e®ort. The Proof is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 1 indicates that if agents di®er only in their skills, test scores provide a correct
ranking of agents according to these skills. The result operates through two channels. First, agents
with higher skills ¯nd it less costly to invest a given level of e®ort. Second, since test scores are
produced using both e®ort and skill, agents with higher skills, have higher test scores for a given
level of e®ort. As a result, they obtain higher psychic (and if Á > 0 also higher monetary) bene¯ts.
6.2 Types with Di®erent Test-Taking Motivation
To capture the possibility that individuals may di®er in their psychic gains from the same test
scores, I add types to the basic model. Thus, agents of di®erent types di®er their test-taking
motivation, i.e., in their psychic gains from the same test scores. The extended setting is as follows.
Agents are of di®erent types, denoted by µ. Agents with lower values of µ gain less psychic
bene¯ts from test scores, i.e., UTS;µ > 0. The type µ, though, does not a®ect agents' bene¯ts from
money, i.e., UM;µ = 0. Assuming, as before, that agents' bene¯ts are a function of test scores
and money, we can write their bene¯ts as U(TS;M;µ). As before, agents are endowed with skills,
27The results can be easily extended to situations in which test scores a®ect agents' future.
14denoted by, x. The random variable x has a density which may depend on the type, denoted by
f(x;µ). I assume that given a skill level, x, and an e®ort level, e, agents of di®erent types will have
the same test scores and the same cost function. Hence, the the production and cost functions do
not depend on µ and the assumptions regarding these functions are unchanged.28 An agent of type
µ with a skill level x chooses an e®ort level, e, to maximize bene¯ts minus costs.
Proposition 2 Conditional on µ, test scores provide a correct ranking of agents according to their
skills. If the marginal utility of money is increasing in Á, holding µ ¯xed, an increase in Á results
in higher e®ort and higher test scores. Moreover, holding skill level ¯xed, agents with higher values
of µ invest more e®ort, and have higher test scores. The Proof is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 2 suggests that if individuals have di®erent test-taking motivation, then, unless the
test score distributions of di®erent types do not overlap, test scores do not provide a correct ranking
of the population according to individuals' skills. The intuition is as follows. Agents with lower
values of µ choose to invest less e®ort, as they have lower marginal bene¯ts from higher test scores,
and the same marginal costs. As test scores are produced using both skill and e®ort, and types with
lower values of µ systematically invest less e®ort, they have lower test scores. Thus, the comparison
of test scores across types is uninformative with respect to their relative skills. A possible way to
recover the rank according to skill in the population as a whole is to induce test-takers to invest
maximum e®ort levels. This may be achieved by providing incentives to test-takers.
Proposition 3 Denote the skill of type µi by xi(µi). xi(µi) is a random variable with a density
function f(xi;µi), and support xi · xi(µi) · xi; where i = 1;2 and µ1 > µ2. If TS(x1;Á;µ1) ¯rst
order stochastically dominates TS(x2;Á;µ2), this does not imply that x1(µ1) ¯rst order stochastically
dominates x2(µ2). However, if all individuals have the same value of µ, denoted by ~ µ, then if
TS(x1;Á; ~ µ) ¯rst order stochastically dominates TS(x2;Á; ~ µ), then x1(~ µ) ¯rst order stochastically
dominates x2(~ µ). The Proof is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 3 implies that even if we ¯nd, two groups such that the unincentivized test score
distribution of one group ¯rst order stochastically dominates the unincentivized test score distri-
bution of the other, this may not be the case when incentives are provided. If individuals di®er in
their test-taking motivation, it is possible that the group with low values of µ (i.e., low test-taking
motivation), may have the same (or even higher) skill level than the group with high values of µ.
The three propositions suggest how to investigate whether individuals di®er in their test-taking
motivation and not only in their skills. The comparison between propositions 1 and 2 suggests that
in this case the relative ranking of individuals according to their test scores may change with the
provision of incentives. Propositions 3 suggests that ¯rst order stochastic domination of test score
distribution of one group over another may change with the provision of incentives.
28Thus, production function of test scores is given by TS = TS(x;e); where TSe > 0, TSx > 0;TSee · 0;T and
TSex ¸ 0. The cost function is given by C(x;e), where Ce > 0, Cee > 0, Cx < 0;and Cxe · 0. Agent of type µ with
a skill level x needs to choose an e®ort level, e, to maximize bene¯ts minus costs.
15Note that Proposition 1 shows that even if all individuals value test scores in the same manner,
under some conditions (for example, if U(TS;M) = ~ U(TS) + M), the provision of incentives will
result in an increase in e®ort, and as a result an increase in test scores. Therefore, investigating
whether test scores increase with the provision of incentives is uninformative regarding the existence
of individual di®erences in test-taking motivation.
7 Experimental Evidence
The model implies that to test whether individuals vary in their test-taking motivation one needs to
investigate whether individual relative ranking according to their test scores changes under varying
incentives schemes. Improvement between tests and narrowing of gaps between groups are feasible
even when test-taking motivation do not vary across individuals, as long as they di®er in their
ability. To ¯nd changes in relative ranking one needs to examine test scores of the same individuals
for the same test under di®erent incentives schemes. As this data is not available in any of the
conventional data sets, I conducted an experiment to investigate whether test-taking motivation
determines (at least in part) the coding speed scores. Next I describe the experiment and its results.
7.1 Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of 2 treatments, described below. As the model implies that in order to
distinguish between varying test-taking motivation and varying ability one needs to look at rank
changes, the design chosen is within subject design. In each of the treatments participants solved
three versions of the coding speed test. Each test lasted 10 minutes and consisted of 140 questions.29
The experiment was conducted at Harvard using the CLER subject pool and standard recruiting
procedures. Overall 127 individuals participated in the two treatments: 99 in six sessions conducted
in Spring 2006 for the main treatment (50 men and 49 women) and 28 (14 men and 14 women)
in one session conducted in Fall 2006 for the control. Each participant received a $10 show-up fee
and an additional $5 for completing the experiment. Participants were told in advance how many
parts the experiment had, and that one will be randomly chosen for payment at the end of the
experiment. However, participants were only informed of the tasks they need to perform in each
part and the compensation scheme immediately before performing the task. The instructions are
given in Section D1 in Appendix D. The speci¯c compensation schemes and tasks were as follows.
Main Treatment: Part 1 { Fixed Payment: Participants were asked to solve two versions of
29The tests were constructed in the following manner. For each test, 200 words were randomly chosen from a list
of 240 words, and were then randomly ordered to construct 20 keys. For each word in the keys a random number
between 1000 and 9999 was drawn. Of the 10 words in each key, 7 were randomly chosen to be the questions. The
possible answers for each question were then randomly drawn (without replacement and excluding the correct answer)
from the 9 remaining possible numbers in the key. Then the placement of the correct answer (1-5) was drawn, and
the correct code was inserted in this place. All participants saw the same tests. Given this construction process,
there is no reason to believe tests vary in their degree of di±culty.
16the coding speed test, the ¯rst was called a practice test. Their payment, if part 1 is randomly
chosen for payment, was $10. Below, I refer to these two tests as the practice test and the $10 test.
The practice test was administered for two reasons. First, if learning occurs it may be restricted
to the duration of this test. Second, if learning is not an issue, then the practice test, as the $10
test, is administered without performance-based incentives, though (some) participants may have
been less motivated to take it. Thus, the comparison between these two tests may help assessing if
individual di®erences in valuation of money are driving the results.
Part 2 { Piece Rate Compensation: Participants were asked to solve a third version of the
coding speed test. Below, I refer to this test as the incentives test. They were given a choice between
payment based on their (known) performance on the $10 test and a payment based on their future
performance on the incentives test. Their payment, if part 2 is randomly selected for payment, was
the following. If they chose to be paid according to their past performance they received $10£(the
fraction of $10 test questions solved correctly). If they chose to be paid according to their future
performance they received $30£(the fraction of incentives test questions solved correctly).
The main purpose of the experiment is to ¯nd whether test-taking motivation plays a large role
in determining the coding speed scores. To achieve this goal, there has to be a treatment in which
participants are motivated to take the test. Thus, if participants are choosing the piece rate, this
can serve, at least to some degree, as an indication that the incentives scheme is desirable. If even
after choosing the piece rate scheme some participants do not improve their performance, then this
may indicate that they invested high levels of e®ort even without performance-based incentives.
Control (for Learning) Treatment: All three parts in this treatment were identical. In each,
participants were asked to solve the coding speed test. They were told that if the current part is
randomly selected for payment, they will receive $10.
Survey: At the end of the experiment, after subjects solved the three tests, they were asked to
answer a survey and a psychological questionnaire, designed to detect the \Big Five" constructs.30;31
The Testing Program - Performance Measures and Guessing: Figure D1 in Appendix D
depicts a typical screen of the testing program. The key and the answers are on the left hand side,
while the answer sheet (an electronic \bubble sheet") is on the right. To answer a question subjects
had to press one of the radio buttons associated with the question. To see the next (previous)
key and the answers associated with it subjects had to press the \Continue" (\Go Back") button.
Similarly, subjects could move between the answers on the answer sheet by pressing the \Next" and
\Previous" buttons. The testing program recorded all the answers given when any of these buttons
was pressed and recorded all answers given every 30 seconds. Using the information gathered by
the program, it is possible to identify the 30-second intervals in which participants were guessing,
30I discuss the \big 5" constructs in detail below.
31Given the evidence on framing e®ects (see for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) and stereotype threat
e®ects (see for example, Steele. and Aronson, 1998), the survey was conducted at the end of the experiment.
17i.e., answered questions which were part of keys they did not see. Moreover, for each participant
we know how many questions they correctly answered in up to twenty 30-second periods.
7.2 Basic Experimental Results
The results reported below include all participants, as all 99 subjects chose the piece rate scheme
in the second part. Table 6 reports the means and standard deviations of performance for the
three tests. In the ¯rst 3 columns, performance is measured by the sum of correct answers on each
test. In the last 3 columns, the measure of performance used is the number of correct answers per
30-second period. As it is impossible to know how many questions participants answered correctly
in the periods after the ¯rst guess (since some of the questions were already guessed correctly),
I restrict attention to the periods before the ¯rst guess. Participants' performance has improved
signi¯cantly between the tests. Between the practice and $10 tests participants correctly solved
on average 13.8 more questions, which is a signi¯cant improvement in performance (a one-sided
t-test allowing for unequal variances yields p < 0.001). The improvement between the practice and
$10 tests is also seen in the number of correct answers in the 30-second periods before the ¯rst
guess. Between the ¯rst two tests participants improved signi¯cantly by 0.82 correct answers per 30
seconds (a one-sided t-test allowing for unequal variances yields p < 0.001). Between the $10 and
incentives tests participants signi¯cantly improved even further, and correctly solved on average 8.2
more questions (a one-sided t-test allowing for unequal variances yields p = 0.003). Participants
also correctly solved signi¯cantly more questions per 30-second in the incentives test than in the
$10 test. On average, between the two tests participants improved by 0.32 correct answers per 30
second (a one-sided t-test allowing for unequal variances yields p < 0.001).
In addition, when examining the variance of the total number of correct answers in each test a
pattern is emerging. The variance in test scores is the largest for the $10 test. It increases by 77%
in comparison to the incentives test and by 54% in comparison to the practice test (a two-sided
F-test yields p = 0.033 for equality of variances between the $10 and incentives tests and p = 0.005
for equality of variances between the $10 and the practice tests).
The improvement in performance may be in response to the incentives scheme or may indicate
learning. To separate the two explanations we would like to know what would have been partici-
pants' test score had they took the coding speed test repeatedly without a change in the (implicit
and explicit) incentives. The control treatment, in which participants took the test three times for
a ¯xed payment, answers this question directly.32 The results of the control treatment are very dif-
32As it is possible that learning occurs only if incentives are supplied, a treatment in which subjects take the
test repeatedly under a piece rate pay scheme will not help in separating the e®ects of learning from those of
incentives.Moreover, changing the order of the tasks (i.e., ¯rst administering a test with incentives and then one
without) will not help either. The expected result is that subjects will not experienced an increase in scores from an
incentivized to an unincentivized test. Interesting as it may be, the reason has nothing to do with learning, but with
a crowding out e®ect the extrinsic incentives will have in this case.
18ferent than the ones in the main treatment. Speci¯cally, mean performances (standard deviations)
were 90.3 (21.1), 93.6 (26.5), and 88.5 (31.7) for the ¯rst, second, and third test, respectively. Thus,
participants have actually experienced an insigni¯cant decrease of 5.1 correct answers on average
between the second and the third time they took the test (a one-sided t-test allowing for unequal
variances yields p = 0.26) instead of a signi¯cant increase of 8.2 in the main treatment. Between the
¯rst two tests there was an insigni¯cant improvement of 3.3 correct answers on average (a one-sided
t-test allowing for unequal variances yields p = 0.3) instead of a signi¯cant increase of 14 correct
answers on average in the main treatment.33 In addition, while the test score distributions in the
¯rst test are not signi¯cantly di®erent between the two treatments (Mann-Whitney test yields p
= 0.90), they di®er for the last two tests (Mann-Whitney test yield p = 0.04 for the second test
and p < 0.001 for the third test). The results of the control treatment show that even if learning
occurs between the tests, it only occurs if incentives are provided.34
7.3 Change in Relative Ranking
The improvement in average performance documented above does not rule out the possibility that
the coding speed scores provide a correct ranking of individuals according to their skills when
no performance-based incentives are supplied. Next, I investigate this question. Speci¯cally, I ask
whether participants who have the same test scores in one test have the same test scores on another
and whether participants react di®erently to the lack of performance-based incentives. While
investigating the rank changes directly seems to be the most straightforward way, it necessitates
the most ad hoc assumptions, as even small changes in test scores may lead to changes in ranking.
For completeness, these results are provided in Section D3 in Appendix D.
7.3.1 Do Di®erent Tests Allow for Comparison between Participants' Ability?
If the coding speed scores provide correct ranking of individuals according to their ability then two
individuals with the same test scores on a given test have the same ability. Therefore, they should
have the same test scores on any other test, regardless of the incentives. I start by investigating
33As a robustness check, I ran the following simulations. I randomly drawn, with replacement, a group of 14
men and 14 women from the main treatment participants, and calculated the mean improvement in their test scores
between consecutive tests. I repeated this exercise a 1,000,000 times. The probability that participants in the main
treatment would experience an average increase between the practice and $10 tests smaller than 4 correct answers
is 0.0002. The probability that they would experience an average decrease between the $10 and incentives test of 5
correct answers or more is less than 0.0001.
34Consistent with the result of the control treatment, I ¯nd little evidence for learning within the tests. In individual
¯xed e®ects regressions of the number of correct answers in the 30-second periods before ¯rst guess on period number
and period number squared, I ¯nd for both the $10 and incentives tests that the number of correct answers is
decreasing over time. This decrease is a common ¯nding in the psychological literature and is usually attributed to
fatigue or boredom (see for example, Revelle, 1993). For the practice test the relationship between the number of
correct answers and time is concave; after about 7 minutes, the number of correct answers is decreasing with time.
Learning within the practice test may account for less than half of the increase in test score between the practice and
$10 tests. These results are reported in Table D1 in Appendix D.
19whether participants who had the same scores on one test had the same scores on another. Note
that this measure can only serve as a lower bound for the amount of rank changing. Speci¯cally,
pairs in which two individuals did not have the same scores on one test and changed their relative
ranking without having the same scores on another test would not be captured by this measure.
To construct this measure of rank change, the meaning of \having the same test scores" had
to be determined. Without adopting a (possibly ad hoc) criterion, it is impossible to use the total
test scores to answer this question. Instead, I examine the performance in the 30-second periods
before participants started guessing, and use statistical de¯nitions to determine whether two mean
performances are the same or not. I use a t-test allowing for unequal variances to test whether the
mean performance of every pair of participants is di®erent at the 5% signi¯cance level in any two
tests. I then count the number of pairs for whom mean performance is signi¯cantly di®erent in
one test but not in the other. Of the 465635 possible participants' pairs 56.7% (2642 pairs) have
performance which is not signi¯cantly di®erent in either the $10 or the incentives tests or both. Of
those 2642 pairs, 51.1% (1349 pairs) have signi¯cantly di®erent performance on the $10 test but
not on the incentives test and vice verse. Similarly, of the 4656 possible participants' pairs 60.6%
(2823 pairs) have performance which is not signi¯cantly di®erent in either the practice or the $10
tests or both. Of those 2823 pairs, 53.7% (1517 pairs) have signi¯cantly di®erent performance on
the $10 test but not on the practice test and vice verse.36
Even in a very restrictive measure of rank changes, I ¯nd that for more than half of the partic-
ipants the coding speed scores do not provide correct indication regarding their relative abilities.
Moreover, the changes in ranks between the practice and the $10 tests suggest that rank changing
cannot only stem from individual di®erences in the valuation of money. In particular, in terms of
monetary incentives there is no change between the practice and $10 tests. In both, payment does
not depend on performance. However, participants did change their behavior. Learning cannot
account for the increase in test scores between these two tests. Instead, some participants may be
trying harder when the test is called \The Test" while others do not. Thus, it seems that some par-
ticipants value the test scores higher in the $10 test than in the practice test. This by itself implies
that the test scores are correlated with an increase in e®ort unrelated to participants' ability.
7.4 Do Individuals React Di®erently to the Lack of Incentives?
Having shown that the individuals' ranking according to their test scores changes, I next provide
further evidence that the least motivated individuals, and not the least able ones, are the ones
that do not try their best unless performance-based incentives are provided. Economic theory
35For two participants, one in the $10 test and one in the incentives test, who have started guessing in the ¯rst
and the second periods respectively, it is impossible to construct this measure of performance.
36Of the 4656 possible participants' pairs 62.5% (2909 pairs) have performance which is not signi¯cantly di®erent in
either the practice or the incentives tests or both. Of those 2909 pairs, 54.1% (1574 pairs) have signi¯cantly di®erent
performance on the practice test but not on the incentives test and vice verse.
20suggests that participants will not invest e®ort in solving the practice and $10 tests, while they will
invest e®ort when solving the incentives test. The left hand panel of Figure 3 provides an example.
The ¯gure depicts the number of correctly answered questions in each 30-second period, before
participants numbers 84 and 89 started guessing for each of the three tests. The ¯rst 20 periods
depict performance in the practice test, periods 21 to 40 performance on the $10 test, and the last
20 periods performance on the incentives one. The (signi¯cantly) improved (average) performance
on the incentives test suggests that while participant 84 can solve the test, they did not care to
show it. Without seeing participant 84 performance on the incentives test, we may have concluded
that they cannot solve the coding speed test. The right hand panel of Figure 3 depicts a di®erent
behavior by participant 89. Participant 89 does pretty well on the practice test. Nevertheless,
once they are told that the test counts (The ($10) test) they improve (signi¯cantly) their (average)
performance. However, the provision of performance-based incentives does not cause participant
89 to further improve (signi¯cantly) their performance. Examining Figure 3 as a whole, we notice
that while participant 84 signi¯cantly improved their performance between the $10 and incentives
tests, and participant 89 did not, participant 84 is still performing worse than participant 89.
The model provide a straightforward way to test whether the participants who behave similarly
to participant 84 are less motivated or less able than participants who behave like participant 89.
To do that, we need to examine their test score distributions on the $10 and incentives tests and
see whether we draw di®erent conclusions regarding their relative ability from the two tests. Note
that investigating the average treatment e®ect will not help us answer this question. As the model
shows, it is possible that test scores will increase in response to incentives even without individual
di®erences in test-taking motivation. To classify participants into groups, I examine the improve-
ment in individuals' own performance between the di®erent tests. The measure of performance I
use is the mean number of correct answers in the 30-second periods before participants' ¯rst guess.37
Between the $10 and the incentives tests 37 participants out of 99 signi¯cantly improved their own
performance,38 while the other 62 participants did not.39 To simplify the exposition I will refer to
the group whose members signi¯cantly improved their own performance as \Economists" (as their
behavior agrees with economic theory predictions). I will refer to the other group as \Boy Scouts"
37Three individuals started guessing early on the $10 and incentives tests. Thus, it is impossible to test whether
they signi¯cantly improved between the tests. However, all 3 had multiple periods in the $10 test in which they did
not try to solve any question (one guessed the whole test in the ¯rst 2 minutes and then ended the test). None of the
three experienced in the incentives test, in the periods before they have started guessing, any period in which they
did not try to answer any question, or even a period in which they correctly answered no question. Thus, they all
have been classi¯ed as experiencing a signi¯cant improvement between the $10 and the incentives tests. The results
reported below remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same if they are excluded from the analysis.
38The criterion used was signi¯cance level of 5% or less using a one sided t-tests allowing for unequal variances. As
a robustness check I used a signi¯cance level of 10%, and the results reported below remain qualitatively the same.
39Only two participants experienced a signi¯cant decline in their performance, their behavior may be consistent
with incentives crowding out intrinsic motivation as modeled in Benabou and Tirole (2003). These 2 participants are
assigned to the group that did not signi¯cantly improved. The results below remain qualitatively and quantitatively
the same if I exclude them from the analysis or assign them to the other group.
21(as they seem to be trying their best even when no performance-based incentives were supplied).
While individuals in one group signi¯cantly improved their performance (the \Economists"), as is
clearly demonstrated in Figure 3, the relationship between the total test score distributions of the
two groups on di®erent tests cannot be de¯ned theoretically.
Figure 4 presents the cumulative distribution of total test scores of the two groups in the di®erent
tests. Panel A presents the total test scores in the incentives test. Panel A suggests that once
performance-based monetary incentives are supplied the two distributions of total test scores are
the same. To test for stochastic dominance I follow McFadden (1989). Neither the hypothesis that
the tests score distribution of the \Economists" ¯rst order stochastically dominates the distribution
of the \Boy Scouts" can be rejected (p = 0.420) nor the opposite one (p = 0.757). A similar picture
arises when examining the maximum scores each participant achieved in the experiment (Panel B),
which are the best estimate of participants' ability. Again, there is no di®erence in the test score
distributions between the two groups. Neither the hypothesis that the tests score distribution of the
\Economists" ¯rst order stochastically dominates the test score distribution of the "Boy Scouts"
can be rejected (p = 0.266) nor the opposite one (p = 0.839). Thus, these two panels suggest that
both groups have the same underlying ability.
A di®erent picture arises when looking at the total test scores of participants in the $10 and
practice tests (Panels C and D, respectively). while we would expect that the \Economists" to
do worse, the magnitudes are surprising. In accordance with the rank changes shown before, the
hypothesis that the test score distribution of the "Economists" ¯rst order stochastically dominates
the test score distribution of the \Boy Scouts" can be rejected for both the practice test (p = 0.025)
and the $10 tests (p = 0.002). However, for both tests the opposite one cannot be rejected (p =
0.967 and p = 1 for the practice and the $10 tests, respectively). Moreover, the di®erences in the
mean performance on the $10 test are striking. While the \Economists" correctly solved on average
93.4 questions, the \Boy Scouts" correctly solved on average 110.6 questions (a t-test yields p <
0.001). This di®erence is as big as the standard deviation across participants in the incentives test.
In contrast, the di®erence between the groups in the incentives test is 2 correct answers (111.1 for
the \Economists" and 113.2 for the \Boy Scouts", a t-test yields p = 0.57).
Figure 4 and the subsequent tests suggest that when no performance-based monetary incen-
tives were provided, there is a group of participants that have chosen to invest little e®ort (the
\Economists"). Just looking at their test scores in the $10 test (or the practice test) one would
label them as low ability individuals. However, once performance-based monetary incentives are
supplied, it turns out that they have the same ability distribution as their fellow participants who
choose to work hard in the ¯rst place (the \Boy Scouts").
Looking at the pattern of improvement between the practice and the $10 test, each of the two
groups of participants identi¯ed above can be further divided into two groups. Of the 62 participants
who did not signi¯cantly improved their own average performance between the $10 and incentives
22tests, 42 have signi¯cantly improved their own average performance between the practice and $10
tests.40 This suggest that while some participants tried their best already in the practice test (20
participants overall, their mean performance in the practice test is 96.25), others needed to hear
that the test is important (i.e., \The ($10) test") in order to try their best (42 participants overall),
and yet others needed performance-based monetary incentives (37 participants) to try their best.41
The basic experimental results indicate that the variance of the test scores is the largest in the
$10 test. Now we have an explanation. While in the incentives and practice tests the heterogeneity
in motivation amongst subjects does not play a role, as in the former all are motivated, and in the
latter most invest little e®ort. It does play a role in the $10 test in which about 60% invest high
e®ort and the rest invest little e®ort. As a result the variance in test scores increases.
7.4.1 Individual Characteristics and E®ort Choice in Tests without Incentives
In this section I investigate whether individual characteristics are correlated with participants'
e®ort choices. I start by investigating the relationship between gender and e®ort choices. I ¯nd
that women are more likely to invest high e®ort even without performance-based incentives. Of
the 49 female participants, only 14 (28.6%) were classi¯ed as \Economists". In contrast, out of the
50 male participants 23 (46%) were classi¯ed as \Economists". A Chi-squared test for the equality
of the distributions yields p = 0.073. While this may seem at odds with the evidence gathered in
¯eld experiments suggesting that females are more likely to improve their performance with the
provision of incentives (see for example Angrist and Lavy, 2004), the evidence from psychology
may provide an explanation. Duckworth and Seligman (2006) ¯nd that as women are more self
discipline than men, they outperform men on tasks that require long term investment (like grades
in school). While in ¯eld experiments students need to invest high e®ort for long periods of time,
in the experiment, e®ort is concentrated in a very short period of time (10 minutes). Thus, these
di®erences in the period during which individuals need to invest e®ort may explain the di®erences
in results regarding gender. Given these di®erences across gender, below I examine the relationship
between e®ort choices and individual characteristics by gender.
At the end of the experiment, as part of the survey, participants were asked to report their SAT
scores, all but 2 men and a woman did so. As participants in the two groups do as well on the
incentives test, we should expect to see no di®erences in their SAT scores. Indeed, SAT scores do
not relate to individuals' e®ort choices. For the participants who reported SAT scores, the average
SAT scores of male \Economists" is 1,433 while the average SAT scores of males \Boy Scouts" is
40Between the practice and the $10 tests 59 participants have signi¯cantly improved their performance, while
between the $10 and incentives tests only 37 participants did so. A ¯sher exact test for the equality of the distributions
yields p = 0.002 (a chi-squared test for the equality of the distributions yields p = 0.003). This suggests that the
improvement between the tests cannot be attributed to noise that is generated by the same process in all tests, as
we would have expected that the fraction of individuals improving between any two tests would stay the same.
41While 17 of the participants who signi¯cantly improved their performance between the $10 and incentives tests
also responded to the cue \The ($10) test", they only did their best when monetary incentives were supplied.
231,454. The average SAT scores of female \Economists" is 1,427 while the average SAT scores of
female \Boy Scouts" is 1,404. These di®erences are not signi¯cant, a one sided t-test allowing for
unequal variances yield p = 0.32 and p = 0.72 for men and women, respectively.42
After solving the three tests participants were asked to answer the \Big 5" questionnaire.
The \Big Five" theory is part of a research in psychology, dating back to the 1930's, trying to
empirically ¯nd the most important ways in which individuals di®er from one another. The common
classi¯cation of personality traits is to ¯ve dimensions, which are referred to as the big ¯ve.43 These
¯ve constructs are de¯ned as follows (following Roberts et al., 2004). Extroversion re°ects the
tendency to be socially active and assertive; Agreeableness the tendency to be trusting, modest,
altruistic, and warm; Conscientiousness the tendency to be rule following, task- and goal-directed,
planful, and self controlled; Neuroticism contracts the experience of anxiety, worry, anger, and
depression with even-temperedness; Openness to experience re°ects the tendency to be open to
new ideas, complex, original, and creative. The big ¯ve literature relates these traits to various
aspects of individuals' life, including economic success. Of these traits, conscientiousness is the
one that most consistently relates to job performance, job seeking behavior, and retention at work
(Judge et al., 1999). The \Big 5" questionnaire includes 50 statements (10 for each construct).44
Participants were asked to indicate on a ¯ve-point scale how accurately each statement describes
their usual behavior. To create the ¯ve constructs the answers to the questionnaire were added
within each construct.45
Overall, 91 participants (44 men and 47 women) had answered all 50 questions, of those 2 men
and a women did not report SAT scores. The results reported below are for this restricted sample.
For male participants, e®ort choices can be related to conscientiousness. Speci¯cally, the average
conscientiousness level of male \Economists" is 8.3 while the average conscientiousness level of male
\Boy Scouts" is 13.4 (a one sided t-test allowing for unequal variances yields p = 0.024).46 No
other personality construct is related to male participants' type. I ¯nd no personality trait that
can predict female e®ort choices.
Table 7 investigates further the relationship between the answers to the \Big 5" questionnaire
42For the restricted sample of 88 subjects who also answered the \Big 5" questionnaire in full, the average SAT
scores of male \Economists" is 1,429 while the average SAT scores of males \Boy Scouts" is 1,457. The average
SAT scores of female \Economists" is 1,427 while the average SAT scores of female \Boy Scouts" is 1,397. These
di®erences are not signi¯cant, a one sided t-test allowing for unequal variances yield p = 0.29 and p = 0.77 for men
and women, respectively.
43For an excellent summary on the big ¯ve theory see McCrae and John (1992).
44The survey was taken from http://ipip.ori.org/newQform50b5.htm. It was administered without incentives,
mainly since it is unclear how to provide incentives for such a test. If participants just randomly chosen their answers
then the resulting test scores would not be very informative about participants' personalities
45When a question was phrased in a negative manner (e.g., \Worry about things") the answers were subtracted.
46As a robustness check I used probit regressions to impute the missing answers on the \big 5" questionnaire. To
predict the missing value, the answers of other participants, of the same gender, to the questions within the same
personality construct were used. Using the imputed values, the average conscientiousness level of male \Economists"
is 9.3 while the average conscientiousness level of male \Boy Scouts" is 12.4. This di®erence is statistically signi¯cant;
a one sided t-test allowing for unequal variances yields p = 0.072.
24and participants' choice of e®ort in dept. Panel A (B) of Table 7 describes the mean answers to the
questions in which male (female) \Boy Scouts" signi¯cantly di®er from male (female) \Economists".
Panel A, shows why di®erences are found for male participants. Speci¯cally, male \Boy Scouts"
have consistently favorable answers to the questions in the consciousness construct. In Addition,
di®erences in answers to some questions on other constructs suggest that male \Boy Scouts" may
be extraverts and neurotic. These di®erences may indicate that male \Boy Scouts" are more
competitive. In Psychology, Graziano et al. (1985) ¯nd extravert individuals to be more competitive.
In economics, Charness and Grosskopf (2001) report that unhappy individuals have competitive
preferences. Diener et al. (1990) report that the unhappy people are more likely to be neurotic.
In contrast, no coherent pattern emerges when examining female participants' answers (Panel B
of Table 7). If anything, female answers seem to be a®ected by the experiment (female \Economists"
insist that they do not shirk on their duties and have excellent English knowledge). Neverthe-
less, this is not a source of concern for the following reasons. All participants went through the
same treatments (i.e., took the practice, $10, and incentives tests). Moreover, \Boy Scouts" and
\Economists" have the same test score distributions on the incentives test (true for men and women
separately). The di®erences are on the $10 test (and the practice test). Therefore, if something
in the experiment caused female \Economists" to answer the questionnaire di®erently than female
\Boy Scouts", it has to relate to their choices in the experiment. However, while female partic-
ipants' answers to the questionnaire support the notion that participants of two groups behaved
di®erently in the experiment, their e®ort choices cannot be linked to their personality traits.
As part of the survey participants were asked to report the university they attend at and
their major. For male participants I ¯nd no correlations between e®ort choices and either their
major or the university they attend.47 While for female participants I ¯nd no correlations be-
tween e®ort choices and the university they attend,48 I do ¯nd correlations between their e®ort
choices and their major. Speci¯cally, of the 16 women majoring in Arts or Humanities only one
(6.25%) is an \Economist", while of the 26 women majoring in Social science or business 11 (42.3%)
are \Economists" and of the 7 women majoring in Physical or Natural sciences 2 (28.5%) are
\Economists". Fisher exact test yields p = 0.03. While female participants majoring Arts and
Humanities are less likely to be \Economists" than female participants majoring in Business and
Social sciences (¯sher exact test yields p = 0.015), female participants majoring Physical or Natural
sciences are as likely to be \Economists" as are female participants majoring Arts and Humanities
47Of the 39 men enrolled at Harvard or MIT 17 (40%) are \Economists", of the 4 men enrolled in BU 2 (50%)
are \Economists", and of the 7 men enrolled in smaller universities in the Boston area 4 (57.1%) are \Economists".
Fisher exact test for the equality of the distributions yields p = 0.879. Of the 15 men majoring in Arts or Humanities
6 (40%) are \Economists", of the 23 men majoring in Social science or business 11 (47.8%) are \Economists", and of
the 12 men majoring in Physical or Natural sciences 6 (50%) are \Economists". Fisher exact test yields p = 0.873.
48Of the 32 women enrolled at Harvard 8 (25%) are \Economists", of the 11 enrolled in BU 4 (36.4%) are
\Economists", and of the 6 enrolled in universities in the Boston area 2 (33.3%) are \Economists". Fisher exact
test yields p = 0.642.
25or in Business and Social sciences (¯sher exact tests yield p = 0.209 and p = 0.676, respectively).
8 Discussion and Conclusions
The analysis in this paper focuses on a very simple test, the coding speed test, whose scores may
strongly depend on individuals' test-taking motivation due to its simplicity. Experimental data,
the NLSY survey data, and data from the armed forces are utilized to investigate the relationship
between the coding speed scores, test-taking motivation, cognitive skills, and economic success.
In the NLSY sample I ¯nd that, controlling for the AFQT scores, an increase in the coding
speed scores is signi¯cantly associated with an increase in earnings of male workers. Moreover, the
coding speed scores are relatively more important to the earnings of low educated workers, while the
AFQT scores are relatively more important to earnings of highly educated ones. The data available
from the armed forces shows that potential recruits scored higher than the NLSY participants on
the coding speed test. The experimental results show that subjects responded di®erently to the
lack of incentives. About 40% of subjects improved their own performance with the provision of
incentives, while the rest did not. Both groups, though, had the same test score distributions when
incentives were provided. Moreover, those male participants who are more conscientious and female
participants were more likely to invest high e®ort in the test without performance-based incentives.
While there are several explanations that could account for each of these ¯ndings alone, one
simple explanation could account for all. Namely, due to the simplicity of the coding speed test,
its scores, when no performance-based incentives are provided, are highly correlated with test-
taking motivation. Moreover, test-taking motivation itself correlates with personality traits like
conscientiousness that are valued in the market, but not with cognitive ability. Thus, potential
recruits are doing better than NLSY participants on the coding speed test since they are more
motivated to take it. At the same time, for the NLSY participants, the coding speed test is a
low-stakes test, thus, higher scores indicate favorable (in the labor market) personality traits. As
a result we ¯nd correlations between the coding speed scores and earnings.
The experimental results show that some individuals do not try their best when no performance-
based incentives are provided, while others do. The individuals that do not try their best are not
the least able ones. If this behavior does not depend on a particular test, then all low-stakes
test scores will measure a combination of cognitive and non-cognitive skills.49 This suggests that
inferences from test score distributions to ability distributions may be questionable. Unless evidence
is provided that all test-takers tried their best or other controls are used, caution should be exercised
when interpreting results where test scores are either the dependent or the independent variable.
Not all the implications of the results presented in this paper are negative. In particular, as
49While evidence in Borghans et al. (2008) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) are not su±cient to determine the
relationship between ability and e®ort invested in low-stakes IQ and SAT-like tests, they do not refute this possibility.
26long as the purpose of using test scores is to have a measure of (unobserved) individual character-
istics important for economic success, low-stakes test scores may even be a better measure than
previously assumed. Not only low-stakes test scores combine cognitive and non-cognitive measures,
the environment in which they are obtained (i.e., no explicit performance-based incentives and no
explicit monitoring) probably resembles the typical work place to a large degree. Workers that
invest high e®ort in this environment and have the necessary skills are probably more valuable.
The results in this paper may have bearing beyond the academic discussion, particularly, with
the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. The NCLB test is a high-stakes test for schools,
which may lose funding and close if their students perform poorly. For students, though, it is a
low-stakes test, as their scores do not directly a®ect them. While, in the short run, schools may lose
funding and close even if their students possess the required knowledge, if they are unmotivated, in
the long run, the NCLB act may have positive e®ects. Given the NCLB incentives scheme, schools
can \pass" the exam only if their students know the required material and are motivated to show it.
Thus, \teaching to the test" can help schools only if complemented by motivating their students.50
Anecdotal evidence in the press suggests that schools are well aware of this. In particular, principals
try to motivate students by creating \school spirits" and provide prizes to students who do well
(see for example, \Successes at a Big-City System; Focus, Funding Help Turn Around Nation's
8th-Largest School District", Washington Post, June 12, 2007, and \A school's comeback formula:
Expel cynicism, stress reform", The Boston Globe, November 26, 2006). Thus, in the long run, the
NCLB act may result in students having more knowledge and higher non-cognitive skills.
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30The Coding Speed Subtest - Instructions and Sample Questions
The Coding Speed Test contains 84 items to see how quickly and accurately you can ¯nd a number in a
table. At the top of each section is a number table or "key." The key is a group of words with a code
number for each word. Each item in the test is a word taken from the key at the top of that page. From
among the possible answers listed for each item, ¯nd the one that is the correct code number for that word.
Example:
Key
bargain...8385 game...6456 knife...7150 chin...8930
house...2859 music ...1117 sunshine...7489
point...4703 owner...6227 sofa...9645
Answers
A B C D E
1. game 6456 7150 8385 8930 9645
2. knife 1117 6456 7150 7489 8385
3. bargain 2859 6227 7489 8385 9645
4. chin 2859 4703 8385 8930 9645
5. house 1117 2859 6227 7150 7489
6. sofa 7150 7489 8385 8930 9645
7. owner 4703 6227 6456 7150 8930
Figure 1: The Coding Speed Test - Instructions and Sample Questions
Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Key Outcome Variables for Men by
Cohort-Adjusted Coding Speed Test Scores1;2
Low Coding Speed Test Scores - Men with Coding Speed Test Sores Below the Mean3
High Coding Speed Test Scores - Men with Coding Speed Test Sores Above the Mean3
Low Coding Speed Scores High Coding Speed Scores Observations
Variable Mean Standard Mean Standard Di®erence
Deviation Deviation
% Black 22.9 7.6 1969
% Hispanic 8.3 5.2 1969
AFQT Scores -0.55 0.91 0.49 0.80 1.04*** 1969
Years of Schooling 2004 12.3 1.97 14.0 2.41 1.7*** 1484
% Working for Pay in 2003 85.8 93.7 1427
Conditional on Working in 2003
Income 2003 $43,596 $35,069 $67,894 $56,932 $24,298*** 1187
Weeks Worked 2003 48.7 13 50.4 10.2 1.7*** 1187
Hours worked 2003 2253 761 2315 649 62 1187
Wage 2004 $23.1 $45 $37.1 $120.7 $14** 1187
Notes:
1. All numbers are weighted by the appropriate sampling weights.
2. The numbers are calculated for men who where born between October 1st 1961 and September 30th 1964,
who have competed the ASVAB. test and were not given "Spanish Instructions Cards". Individuals belonging
to the poor white over-sample were excluded from the analysis.
3. 47% of men had coding speed scores lower than the mean.
4. Individuals who were de¯ne as working in 2003 are civilians with valid ASVAB scores, who were nor enrolled

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 3: Earnings Men - Using the 4 AFQT Sub-Tests Separately
Dependent Variable: Log of Earnings 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -0.245 -0.378 -0.232 -0.299
(0.069)*** (0.066)*** (0.069)*** (0.068)***
Hispanic -0.132 -0.245 -0.133 -0.155
(0.071)* (0.071)*** (0.070)* (0.068)**
Arithmetic Reasoning 0.075 0.075 0.064
(0.043)* (0.042)* (0.040)
Math Knowledge 0.180 0.157 0.055
(0.051)*** (0.051)*** (0.055)
Word Knowledge 0.024 0.016 -0.028
(0.045) (0.045) (0.043)
Paragraph Comprehension 0.085 0.058 0.046
(0.047)* (0.049) (0.048)
Coding Speed 0.245 0.087 0.062
(0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.027)**
Years of Schooling 2003 0.104
(0.014)***
Age in 2003 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.024
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 10.097 9.892 10.119 8.311
(1.191)*** (1.221)*** (1.189)*** (1.227)***
Observations 1187 1187 1187 1187
R-squared 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.23
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
Notes:
1. The sample includes men who where born between October 1
st 1961 and September 30
th 1964, who competed
the ASVAB test, were not given "Spanish Instructions Cards", and did not belong to the over-sample. The
sample was restricted further to include only civilian workers who reported positive earnings and were not
enrolled in school in 2003 for whom data on schooling is available.
2. AFQT and coding speed scores are school-year cohort adjusted (see Appendix A for details).
33Table 4: The Relationships between AFQT and Coding Speed Scores and Wages in 2004 for
Men of Di®erent Occupations
Dependent Variable: Log of wages 2004
Production Workers with at Managers and Professionals with
Most High School Diploma at Least Associate of Art Degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -0.270 -0.301 -0.042 -0.141
(0.104)** (0.104)*** (0.114) (0.112)
Hispanic -0.202 -0.210 0.028 0.039
(0.115)* (0.118)* (0.104) (0.092)
AFQT Scores -0.043 -0.080 0.172 0.102
(0.087) (0.085) (0.060)*** (0.056)*
Coding Speed Scores 0.110 0.106 0.021 -0.009
(0.061)* (0.056)* (0.067) (0.063)
Years of Schooling 2004 0.113 0.092
(0.032)*** (0.035)***
Age in 2004 0.001 0.026 -0.041 -0.041
(0.049) (0.053) (0.065) (0.065)
Constant 5.827 -44.618 87.036 86.578
(95.561) (102.659) (126.829) (126.716)
Observations 98 98 181 181
R-squared 0.14 0.20 0.04 0.08
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
Notes:
1. The sample includes men who where born between October 1
st 1961 and September 30
th 1964, who competed
the ASVAB test, were not given "Spanish Instructions Cards", and did not belong to the over-sample. The
sample was restricted further to include only civilian who reported positive wages in 2004, were not enrolled
in school in 2004 for whom data on schooling is available.
2. AFQT and coding speed scores are school-year cohort adjusted (see Appendix A for details).
3. See Appendix A for details regarding the occupation data.
34Table 5: Relationship between AFQT and Coding Speed Scores and Family Background and
School Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
AFQT Scores Coding Speed Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black -0.675 -0.565 -0.497 -0.466 -0.411 -0.356
(0.051)*** (0.073)*** (0.074)*** (0.058)*** (0.083)*** (0.085)***
Hispanic -0.289 -0.161 -0.068 -0.046 0.116 0.195
(0.061)*** (0.088)* (0.087) (0.068) (0.090) (0.093)**
Mother High School Grad. 0.308 0.276 0.254 0.186 0.197 0.179
(0.057)*** (0.079)*** (0.078)*** (0.065)*** (0.090)** (0.091)**
Mother College Grad. 0.415 0.323 0.300 0.203 0.225 0.208
(0.093)*** (0.129)** (0.121)** (0.123)* (0.172) (0.166)
Father High School Grad. 0.208 0.207 0.204 0.204 0.172 0.170
(0.058)*** (0.079)*** (0.078)*** (0.062)*** (0.085)** (0.085)**
Father College Grad 0.558 0.605 0.575 0.360 0.382 0.358
(0.082)*** (0.107)*** (0.103)*** (0.099)*** (0.134)*** (0.130)***
Mother Professional 0.207 0.175 0.155 -0.001 -0.087 -0.102
(0.083)** (0.120) (0.118) (0.120) (0.177) (0.179)
Father Professional 0.133 0.045 0.034 0.092 -0.050 -0.057
(0.078)* (0.109) (0.105) (0.098) (0.146) (0.145)
Did Not Live with Both -0.028 -0.099 -0.078 -0.041 -0.074 -0.057
Biological Parents at Age 14 (0.054) (0.076) (0.075) (0.059) (0.085) (0.084)
Number of Siblings -0.044 -0.039 -0.041 -0.038 -0.028 -0.030
(0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.014)** (0.014)**
No Reading Materials -0.346 -0.428 -0.398 -0.279 -0.394 -0.368
at Age 14 (0.081)*** (0.114)*** (0.112)*** (0.102)*** (0.134)*** (0.135)***
Numerous Reading Materials 0.314 0.336 0.313 0.236 0.213 0.194
at Age 14 (0.049)*** (0.068)*** (0.067)*** (0.054)*** (0.075)*** (0.075)***
Student/Teacher Ratio -0.019 -0.016
(0.007)** (0.008)*
Disadvantage Student Ratio -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Dropout Rate -0.004 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)**
Teacher Turnover Rate -0.010 -0.009
(0.004)** (0.005)*
Age 1980 0.030 0.037 0.026 0.008 0.029 0.021
(0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037)
Constant -0.817 -0.957 -0.225 -0.304 -0.686 -0.090
(0.410)** (0.585) (0.601) (0.467) (0.655) (0.676)
Observations 1961 1027 1027 1961 1027 1027
R-squared 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.18 0.15 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
Notes:
1. The sample includes men who where born between October 1
st 1961 and September 30
th 1964, who competed
the ASVAB test, were not given "Spanish Instructions Cards", and did not belong to the over-sample. The
sample is restricted further to include only individuals for whom data on the variables used was not missing
(in speci¯cations 2,3,5, and 6 individuals with missing school data were excluded).
2. AFQT and coding speed scores are school-year cohort adjusted (see Appendix A for details).
3. All speci¯cations also include a dummy equal to one if the information regarding parents' educational attain-
ments is missing. The dummy variables for reading materials at age 14 are constructed from information about
magazines, newspapers, and library cards in the home. "Numerous" means all of the above, "No" means none
of the above.


















Figure 2: CDFs of Raw Coding Speed Test Scores for NLSY participants and Potential
Recruits to the Armed Forces - Men
Table 6: Mean and Standard Deviation of Participants' Performance in the Experiment
Number of Correct Answers in the Test Number of Correct Answers in 30-Second
Periods Before First Guess
Practice $ 10 Test Incentives Practice $ 10 Test Incentives
Test Test Test Test
Mean 90.4 104.2 112.4 4.47 5.29 5.61
Standard Deviation 18.6 23.1 17.3 1.51 1.53 1.52
Observations 99 99 99 1864 1785 1768


































































Practice Test Incentives Test The ($10) Test
Participant # 89
Figure 3: Number of Correct Answers in 30-second Periods before First Guess by Test
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Figure 4: CDFs of Coding Speed Test Scores by Compensation Scheme and Participants Type.
\Economists" are participants who improved their own average performance signi¯cantly between the $10 and
incentives tests. \Boy Scouts" are participants who did not.
37Table 7: Di®erences in Mean Answers to the \Big Five" Questionnaire by Participants'
E®ort Choices
Panel A: Men
Question from "Big ¯ve" Questionnaire "Boy "Economists" Di®erence
Scouts"
Consciousness
Am always prepared (+) 3.633 3.2 0.436 (p = 0.053)
Pay attention to details (+) 4.182 3.6 0.582 (p = 0.024)
Get chores done right away (+) 3.182 2.3 0.882 (p = 0.010)
Follow a schedule (+) 3.682 3.1 0.582 (p = 0.045)
Like order (+) 3.909 3.35 0.559 (p = 0.067)
Shirk my duties (-) 1.864 2.35 -0.486 (p = 0.057)
Often forget to put things back 2.409 3 -0.591 (p = 0.088)
in their proper place (- )
Neuroticism
Worry about things (-) 3.727 3.5 0.477 (p = 0.061)
Seldom feel blue (+) 2.727 3.05 -0.322 (p = 0.155)
Change my mood a lot (-) 3.136 2.65 0.486 (p = 0.060)
Extraversion
Keep in the background (-) 2.864 3.2 -0.336 (p = 0.174)
Don't like to draw attention to myself (-) 2.955 3.7 -0.745 (p = 0.013)
Agreeableness
Take time out for others (+) 3.545 4 -0.454 (p = 0.039)
Panel B: Women
Question from "Big ¯ve" Questionnaire "Boy Scouts" "Economists" Di®erence
Consciousness
Pay attention to details (+) 4.344 3.857 0.487 (p = 0.069)
Shirk my duties (-) 2.188 1.714 0.473 (p = 0.062)
Neuroticism
Am relaxed most of the time (+) 3.5 2.857 0.7642 (p = 0.021)
Worry about things (-) 3.719 3.286 0.433 (p = 0.072)
Openness to Experience
Have a rich vocabulary (+) 3.688 4.285 -0.598 (p = 0.006)
Have excellent ideas (+) 4.219 3.857 0.362 (p = 0.036)
Use di±cult words (+) 3.406 4 -0.593 (p = 0.011)
Am full of ideas (+) 4.25 3.857 0.393 (p = 0.093)
Notes:
1. \Economists" are participants who improved their own average performance signi¯cantly between the $10
and incentives tests. \Boy Scouts" are participants who did not.
2. (+) and (-) next to each question indicates whether the question indicates a positive or negative trait.
3. The sample is restricted to include only participants who answered the Big 5 Questionnaire in full and
reported their SAT scores.
4. p-values are for the one sided t-test allowing for unequal variances.
5. Cells in grey: Signi¯cance of di®erences across types depends on the sample used. In particular, signi¯cance
changes when the sample is only restricted to include all participants who answered a speci¯c question.
38Appendix A: Data Appendix
Table A1: The ASVAB Subtests
Subtest Minutes Questions Description
General Science 11 25 Measures knowledge of physical and biological
sciences
Arithmetic Reasoning 35 30 Measures ability to solve arithmetic word problems
Word Knowledge 11 35 Measures ability to select the correct meaning of
words presented in context, and identify synonyms
Paragraph Comprehension 13 15 Measures ability to obtain information from written
material
Numerical Operations 3 50 Measures ability to perform arithmetic computation
(speeded)
Coding Speed 7 84 Measures ability to use a key in assigning code
numbers to words (speeded)
Auto and Shop Information 11 25 Measures knowledge of automobiles, tools, and shop
terminology and practices
Mathematics Knowledge 24 25 Measures knowledge of high school math principles
Mechanical Comprehension 19 25 Measures knowledge of mechanical and physical
principles, and the ability to visualize how illustrated
objects work
Electronics Information 9 20 Tests knowledge of electricity and electronics
A.1 NLSY Sample Restrictions and Variable Construction
The sample used in Section 4 is restricted to include only individuals that have valid test scores who
were surveyed in 2004.51 To try and avoid endogeniety problems, in particular that either test scores
or test-taking motivation may be a®ected by labor market experience, the sample was restricted
further to include only the three youngest school-year cohorts discussed below, i.e., participants
born between September 1st 1961 and August 31st 1964.52
Participants in the NLSY took the ASVAB exam in the summer of 1980 when they were
16-23 years old. This ages di®erential implies di®erences in educational attainment, which may
a®ect test scores (see for example Hansen et al., 2004, Cascio and Lewis, 2006). In addition, it is
possible that older individuals may be more mature, which may a®ect their test scores. Indeed, the
ASVAB scores increase with age, thus, in order to compare test scores of individuals of di®erent
age groups an adjustment is needed. I adjust the test scores used in the analysis in Section 4 by
school-year cohorts, where a school year-cohort includes all individuals born between October 1st
of one calendar year and September 30th of the subsequent one. Speci¯cally, the residuals from
regressions of the test scores variables on school-year cohort indicators for the restricted sample,
51The participants who got the \Spanish instruction cards" were excluded from the analysis.
52This sample includes some individuals who reported that they have completed 12 years of schooling by May 1
st
1980 (63 men out of 1963, and 97 women out of 1897), and one man who completed 13 years of schooling. The results
reported in Section 4 remains qualitatively and quantitatively the same if the sample is restricted to include only the
two youngest cohorts or all individuals born before January 1
st 1961.
39described above, were normalized to have weighted mean zero and standard deviation one, where
the weights being used are the ASVAB sampling weights. Since women have signi¯cantly higher
coding speed scores than men, the adjustment was done separately by gender. School-year cohorts
may represent better the e®ect of education on test scores while ensuring that individuals of a
given cohort are on average a year older than the individuals of the preceding one. An additional
bene¯t of the school-year cohort normalization is that it excludes participants who were born after
September 30th 1964 from the analysis, which are believed to be a non-random sample.53
The variable years of schooling completed used in the earnings regressions was constructed
using both the data on years of schooling completed as of May 1st of the survey year and the data
on the highest degree ever received. For individuals that reported that they have not received a
high school diploma the actual years of schooling reported were used. Individuals who reported
receiving a high school diploma were assigned 12 years of schooling. For participants who reported
completing at least a year of post secondary degree but did not receive a degree 13 years of schooling
were assigned.54 Those that reported receiving an Associate of Arts degree were assigned 14 years
of schooling. Participants that reported receiving BA or BS degrees were assigned 16 years of
schooling. Those who reported ¯nishing professional school, MS or MA were assigned 18 years of
schooling, and those who reported receiving a Ph.D. were assigned 20 years of schooling.
In the earnings regressions for individuals of di®erent occupations, I used the wage and the
occupation reported for job number 1 in 2004. The sample was restricted to include all civilian
workers not enrolled in school reporting positive wages on job number 1 in 2004 for whom dada on
schooling and test scores is available. The occupation is determined using the 2000 Census occupa-
tional categories. Production workers are workers who reported a job in the categories Production
and Operating Workers or Setter, Operators, and Tenders. Mangers are workers who reported a job
in Executive, Administrative, and Managerial Occupation or in Management Related Occupations.
Professionals are workers who reported a job in Mathematical and Computer Scientists, Engineers,
Architects, and Surveyors, Physical Scientists, Social Scientists and Related Workers categories, or
reported being Lawyers or Judges, Magistrates, and Other Judicial Workers.
In all the regression results reported in Section 4 I use sampling weights. In regressions where the
AFQT or the coding speed scores are the dependent variable I use the provided ASVAB sampling
weights. In regressions where earnings in 2003 or wages in 2004 are the dependent variable I use
the 2004 cross-sectional weights.
53The NLSY sample includes \too few" participants born after September 30
th 1964 in comparison to the general
population (NLSY79 User guide pp.19-20).
54The NLSY variable reporting years of schooling completed as of May 1
st of the survey year assign 16 years of
completed schooling to all individuals who received BA or BS. However, individuals with 17 years of schooling may
be those who continue to graduate school, or those who still did not achieve their degree. Thus, to maintain that
those with more years of competed schooling actually have higher educational attainment this coding was chosen.
40A.1.1 Problem with ASVAB Norming
The purpose of administrating the ASVAB to the NLSY participants was to obtain data on the
vocational aptitudes of American youth during the 1980s and to establish national norm for the
ASVAB. Previously, military recruits had been compared statistically to adult males who were
tested during World War II. To obtained this norm, the ASVAB had to be administered to a
representative sample of American youth. As the U.S. Department of Labor had already started
conducting the NLSY survey, it was decided to administer the ASVAB to the NLSY participants.
The ASVAB adminstration process is known as the Pro¯le of American Youth (PAY80).
As discussed in Section 5, while trying to establish the norm for the ASVAB Maier and Sims
(1983) had problems in comparisoning the ASVAB scores between potential recruits to the armed
forces and NLSY participants of comparable ages (i.e., born before 1/1/1963).55 By 1985 the
problem was considered solved by the military (Maier and Sims, 1986). The di®erences in the
scores between the NLSY participants and potential recruits were attributed to di®erences in the
shape of answer sheets (the NLSY participants ¯lled a \bubble sheet" while potential recruits ¯lled
\slim rectangles") and its layout (the answer sheet used by the military corresponded exactly with
the layout of the questions). Ree and Wegner (1990) have shown in a large-scale experiment that
potential recruits do worse on the \NLSY answer sheet" than on the military one. Comparing
two groups of potential enlists, the authors found that the gaps in scores between the \NLSY
answer sheet" and the military one increase with GT scores (the sum of arithmetic reasoning,
word knowledge, and paragraph comprehension standardized scores).56 However, Maier and Sims
(1983) have shown that gaps in speeded tests' scores between the two populations actually decrease
with GT.57 Not surprisingly then, with the introduction of new ASVAB forms, the problems with
the norming of the speeded tests got even worse (Maier and Hiatt, 1986), and resulted in the
recommendation, that was accepted in 1989, to take the numerical operation test out of the AFQT.
A.1.2 Armed Forces - Variable Construction for Figure 2
The test score distribution for the 1984 male applicants for enlistment (IOT&E 1984), reported
in Figure 2, was constructed using the data provided in Maier and Hiatt (1986). The authors
provide, in Table A-4 pp. A9-A10, a conversion between the coding speed scores of the 1980 Youth
Population (i.e., all NLSY participants who were born before 1/1/1963) and the IOT&E 1984
scores. This conversion was done by setting the raw scores of individuals from the two populations
55The reason the speeded tests attracted so much attention in the military was that the numerical operation test
was until 1989 part of the AFQT that serves as the \entrance exam" to armed forces.
56If people with high GT scores work faster on average, then their speeded test scores would su®er the most if it
takes them longer to record their answers on the \NLSY answer sheet".
57Moreover, potential recruits participating in the experiment were asked to take the speeded tests related to the
research before taking the whole ASVAB (including these two tests) \for real". Therefore, they may not have the
right incentives to answer questions in the research part. In addition, all individuals that displayed large change in
speeded test scores between the research part and the ASVAB part were deleted from the data.
41that had the same cumulative frequency, conditional on measure of ability, equal to one another.
The ability measure used was the HST composite scores, which is the sum of arithmetic reasoning,
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and mechanical comprehension standardized scores. I
used this conversion, the relative weights for each of the HST intervals for the IOT&E 1984 and
the 1980 Youth Population (Maier and Hiatt, 1986, Table A-1, p. A2), and the data available in
the NLSY data set to construct the distribution of raw coding speed score for the IOT&E 1984.
There were two decisions to be made while reconstructing the IOT&E 1984 coding speed scores.
The ¯rst Maier and Hiatt (1986) do not provide an equivalent to test scores of zero. However, 12
NLSY participants had this score. I have set the equivalent test score to zero since it will make the
IOT&E 1984 population look worse. The second, Maier and Hiatt (1986) report a range for coding
speed test score of two (2-10), I have again taken the lowest value (2).
Appendix B: Supplemental Regression Results
Table B1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Key Outcome Variables for Women by
Cohort-Adjusted Coding Speed Test Scores1
Low Coding Speed Test Scores - Women with Coding Speed Test Sores Below the Mean2
High Coding Speed Test Scores - Women with Coding Speed Test Sores Above the Mean2
Low Coding Speed Scores High Coding Speed Scores Observations
Variable Mean Standard Mean Standard Di®erence
Deviation Mean Deviation
% Black 24.7 6.9 1879
% Hispanic 7.9 5.1 1879
AFQT Scores -0.48 0.93 0.39 0.88 0.87*** 1879
Years of Schooling (2004) 12.6 1.97 13.9 2.41 1.3*** 1536
% Working for Pay 2003 79.1 81.9 1466
Conditional on Working in 2003
Income 2003 $ 26,550 $18,495 $37,952 $33,474 $11,401*** 1126
Weeks Worked 2003 46.6 12.1 48.4 9.1 1.8** 1126
Hours worked 2003 1824 774 1871 788 47 1126
Wage 2004 $15.7 $15.7 $23.1 $76.1 $7.3*** 1126
Notes:
1. All numbers are weighted by the appropriate sampling weights, and were calculated for women who where
born between October 1
st 1961 and September 30
th 1964, who have completed the ASVAB and were not
given \Spanish Instructions Cards" and were interviewed in 2004.
2. 45% of women had coding speed scores lower than the mean.
3. Working women in 2003 are civilians with valid ASVAB scores, who were nor enrolled in school in 2003, and
reported positive earnings.
42Table B2: Earnings in 2003 - Women
Dependent Variable: ln(Earnings)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -0.075 0.224 0.104 0.266 0.157
(0.074) (0.086)*** (0.086) (0.091)*** (0.093)*
Hispanic 0.056 0.289 0.136 0.288 0.235
(0.082) (0.085)*** (0.082)* (0.084)*** (0.083)***
AFQT Scores 0.271 0.215 0.075
(0.048)*** (0.050) (0.040)***
Coding Speed Scores 0.210 0.121 0.114
(0.046)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)**
Years of Schooling Completed 2003 0.104
(0.022)***
Age in 2003 -0.014 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)
Constant 10.570 10.250 10.139 10.067 8.869
(1.773)*** (1.729)*** (1.748)*** (1.724)*** (1.723)***
Observations 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076
R
2 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
Notes:
1. The sample includes women who where born between October 1
st 1961 and September 30
th 1964, who have
competed the ASVAB test and were not given \Spanish Instructions Cards", and did not belong to the
over-sample. The sample was restricted further to include only civilian who reported positive earnings in
2003, were not enrolled in school in 2003 for whom data on schooling is available.
2. AFQT and coding speed scores are school-year cohort adjusted (see Appendix A for details).
Table B3: Wages in 2004 - Men
Dependent Variable: ln(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -0.418 -0.172 -0.284 -0.163 -0.191
(0.067)*** (0.066)*** (0.066)*** (0.066)** (0.068)***
Hispanic -0.234 -0.086 -0.173 -0.090 -0.097
(0.091)** (0.093) (0.093)* (0.094) (0.094)
AFQT Scores 0.233 0.182 0.135
(0.034)*** (0.040)*** (0.038)***
Coding Speed Scores 0.188 0.087 0.077
(0.032)*** (0.037)** (0.039)**
Years of Schooling Completed 2004 0.032
(0.023)
Age in 2004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 -0.008
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant 15.318 31.156 18.981 29.390 22.813
(59.544) (57.739) (58.486) (57.708) (58.244)
Observations 1273 1273 1273 1273 1273
R
2 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
Notes:
1. The sample includes men who where born between October 1
st 1961 and September 30
th 1964, who have
competed the ASVAB test and were not given \Spanish Instructions Cards", and did not belong to the
over-sample. The sample was restricted further to include only civilian who reported positive wages in 2004,
were not enrolled in school in 2004 for whom data on schooling is available.
2. AFQT and coding speed scores are school-year cohort adjusted (see Appendix A for details).
43Appendix C - Theoretical Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1:
When performance based incentives are provided and/or agents obtain psychic bene¯ts from higher
test scores, then the optimal level of e®ort, e¤, solves:
@TS(x;e¤)
@e
(UTS + UMÁ) ¡ Ce(x;e¤) = 0: (1)
The second order condition is: D ´ TSee(UTS+ÁUM)+TS2
e
¡
UTS;TS + 2ÁUTS;M + Á2UM;M
¢
¡Cee:
Under the assumptions made above, a su±cient condition to ensure that D < 0, and that the
solution is indeed a maximum, is that TSee · 0:
At the optimal level of e®ort, e¤, the relations between the test scores and skill are given by
dTS
dx




In order to ¯gure out how the optimal level of e®ort, e¤, depends on skill di®erentiate e¤ with







TSex(UTS + ÁUM) + TSeTSx(UTS;TS + 2ÁUTS;M + Á2UM;M) ¡ Cex
¤
: (3)
Using equation (2) and (3) we get dTS
dx = 1
D [TSxTSee(UTS + ÁUM) + TSeCex] > 0. Under the
assumptions made above dTS
dx is positive. Thus, test scores will always increase with skill, regardless
of the relations between optimal e®ort and skill.
To see that an increase in the incentives, i.e. an increase in Á, will result in an increase
in the optimal level of e®ort, di®erentiate e¤ with respect to Á, to get that de¤
dÁ = ¡TSe
D [UM +
TS(UTS;M + ÁUM;M): Under the assumption that the marginal utility is increasing in Á (i.e.,
UM + TS(UTS;M + ÁUM;M) > 0) it is clear that de¤




i.e., an increase in the intensity of the incentives ,Á, will result in an increase in e®ort, and a
corresponding increase in test scores.
Proof. Proposition 2:
The ¯rst order condition is now given by
@TS(x;e¤)
@e
(UTS(µ) + UMÁ) ¡ Ce(x;e¤) = 0 (1a)






Á2UM;M) ¡ Cee. Again the assumption made above are su±cient to ensure that D < 0, and that
the solution is indeed a maximum.
The ¯rst part of the proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1. The only di®erence is that
now UTS is a function of µ (and as a result, so is e¤). Thus, test scores would provide ranking of
individuals that have the same µ:
44To ¯nd how the optimal level of e®ort, e¤, depends the type, µ; di®erentiate e¤ with respect to
µ to get de¤
dµ = ¡ 1





dµ is positive too.
Proof. Proposition 3:
I start by proving the second part. For brevity I use the following notations: TS1(Á) = TS(x1;Á; ~ µ),
TS2(Á) = TS(x2;Á; ~ µ), TS1(Á) = TS(x1;Á), and TS2(Á) = TS(x2;Á): Denote by ~ fi(TSi;Á) the








for all z. As all individuals have the same test-taking motivation, test scores provide a correct
ranking according to skills and thus TS1(Á) ¸ TS2(Á) and TS1(Á) ¸ TS2(Á):
From Proposition 1, we know that test scores are monophonically increasing function of skill,
i.e. dTS
dx > 0; 8x. Thus, xi(Á) = TS¡1(TSi(Á)), where xi(Á) = TS¡1(TSi(Á)); and xi(Á) =















where fi(xi;Á) = ~ fi(TSi (xi;Á)) and i = 1;2:
By Proposition 1, the test scores provide a correct ranking according to skill for all agents, i.e.
there is one to one mapping between test scores and skill, regardless of type. Thus, if TS(z2;Á) =










dx dx; where i = 1;2: Similarly, since TS1 ¸ TS2 and



















Let R be the lowest value of dTS
dx in the range, i.e. R · dTS












dx > 0 for all x; R > 0; then
TS¡1(x) R
x=x2
[f1(x) ¡ f2(x)]dx · 0: Hence, x1 ¯rst order stochasti-
cally dominates x2:
45The ¯rst part can be proven by noticing that the proof above fails already at the ¯rst assertion.
Proposition 2 states that dTS
dx µ > 0, i.e., test scores provide a correct ranking according to skills
only for individuals of the same type. Thus, the condition TS1 ¸ TS2 does not guarantee that
x1 ¸ x2; and similarly TS1 ¸ TS2 does not imply that x1 ¸ x2: Moreover, if TS1 = TS2 then
Proposition 2 implies that x1 < x2; and similarly if TS1 = TS2 then x1 < x2: Hence, if either







it is not true that x(µ1) ¯rst order stochastically dominates x(µ2).
Therefore, without making more assumptions on the skill distributions of the two types, which
are what we want to recover, even in the case where TS (x;Á;µ1) ¯rst order stochastically dominates
TS (x;Á;µ2) we cannot guarantee that x(µ1) ¯rst order stochastically dominates x(µ2).58
Appendix D - Experimental Appendix
D.1 Instructions
D.1.1 Instruction for the Main Treatment
WELCOME
In the experiment today you will be asked to complete two di®erent parts. At the end of the
experiment you will receive $5 for having completed the experiment. In addition, we will randomly
select one of the parts and pay you. Once you have completed the two parts we determine which
part counts for payment by drawing a number between 1 and 2. The method we use to determine
your earnings varies across parts. Before each part we will describe in detail how your payment is
determined.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment for the randomly selected
part, your $5 payment for completing the experiment, and a $10 show up fee. At the end of the
experiment you will be asked to come to the side room where you will be paid in private.
Part 1
For the ¯rst part of the experiment you will be asked to solve one test named Coding Speed. In
this test you will ¯nd a "key", which is a group of words with a code number for each word. Each
item in the test is a word taken from the key at the top of that page. From the possible answers
listed for each item, you need to ¯nd the one that is the correct code number for that word. Your
job is to read each question carefully and decide which of the answers given is correct. Be sure to
work as quickly and as accurately as you can. Your score on the test will be based on the number
of answers you mark correctly. There is no guessing penalty on the test. That means if you answer
58Note also that in additions to further assumptions regarding the support of the skill distributions of the two types,
we would need to assume that
d2TS
dxdµ ¸ 0 in order to get that stochastic dominance in test scores imply stochastic
dominance in skills levels.
46a question wrong, it will not hurt you (it will just not help you). That is why it is always in your
best interest to answer every question.
I will show you a demonstration of the test software and explain how to use it. To familiarize
you with the test, you will be ¯rst given a practice test.
If Part 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you receive $10.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
Part 2
As in the previous part, this part of the experiment includes one test. The test is another version
of the Coding Speed test you just took. However, you now have to choose which payment scheme
you want for this part. You can choose to be paid either a ¯xed amount of money or according to
your future performance on the test in this part.
If Part 2 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this part are deter-
mined as follows. If you choose ¯xed payment then you will be paid according to how well you did
on test 1 in Part 1. You will be paid $10*(fraction of test questions in Part 1 correctly answered).
Thus for example, if in test 1 in Part 1 you correctly answered 70 questions, i.e., you correctly
answered half of test questions, your payment will be $5. If you choose to be paid according to
your future performance on test 2 in Part 2, then your earnings are $30*(fraction of test 2 questions
in Part 2 you correctly answer). Thus for example, if in test 2 in Part 2 you correctly answer 70
questions, i.e., you correctly answer half of test questions, your payment will be $15.
The next computer screen will tell you the fraction of test 1 questions you correctly answered,
and will tell you what your ¯xed payment will be. It will then ask you to choose to be paid either
your ¯xed payment or to be paid according to your future performance on test 2 in Part 2.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
D.1.2 Instruction for the Control Treatment
WELCOME
In the experiment today you will be asked to complete three di®erent parts. At the end of the
experiment you will receive $5 for having completed the experiment. In addition, we will randomly
47select one of the parts and pay you. Once you have completed the three parts we determine which
part counts for payment by drawing a number between 1 and 3. Before each part we will describe
in detail how your payment is determined.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment for the randomly selected
part, your $5 payment for completing the experiment, and a $10 show up fee. At the end of the
experiment you will be asked to come to the side room where you will be paid in private.
Part 1
For the ¯rst part of the experiment you will be asked to solve one test named Coding Speed. In
this test you will ¯nd a "key", which is a group of words with a code number for each word. Each
item in the test is a word taken from the key at the top of that page. From the possible answers
listed for each item, you need to ¯nd the one that is the correct code number for that word. Your
job is to read each question carefully and decide which of the answers given is correct. Be sure to
work as quickly and as accurately as you can. Your score on the test will be based on the number
of answers you mark correctly. There is no guessing penalty on the test. That means if you answer
a question wrong, it will not hurt you (it will just not help you). That is why it is always in your
best interest to answer every question.
I will show you a demonstration of the test software and explain how to use it.
If Part 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you receive $10.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
Part 2(3)
As in the previous part, this part of the experiment includes one test. The test is another version
of the Coding Speed test you just took.
If Part 2(3) is the one randomly selected for payment, then you receive $10.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
48Figure D1: Snapshot of Testing Program's Screen
Table D1: Relations between Number of Correct Answers in 30-Seconds Periods Before
Start Guessing and Period Number
Practice Test Practice Test $10 Test $10 Test Incentives Test Incentives Test
Period 0.021 0.057 -0.013 -0.019 -0.030 -0.028
(0.005)*** (0.021)*** (0.005)*** (0.020) (0.005)*** (0.022)
Period2 -0.002 0.0003 -0.0001
(0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1863 1863 1784 1784 1767 1767
R-Squared 0.39 0.39 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.41
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1% Notes:
1. Individuals who start guessing within the ¯rst minute of the test were excluded. All 30-second periods after
individuals start guessing were excluded too.
2. All regressions include individual ¯x-e®ects.
D.2 Does the Relative Ranking Change?
To further provide evidence on the change in ranks, I examine directly the change in ranks according
to total test scores. To do so, I assign within each test a higher rank to participants with lower
test scores. Thus, participants with the highest test scores are assigned rank 1; participants with
the second to highest scores are assigned rank 2, and so on. This is a very conservative measure of
rank change. In particular, if participant's scores improved between any two tests and now she is
one of the participants with the highest scores, only her own rank will be changing. As it is not
49clear whether small di®erences in test scores indicate to real di®erences in ability, I examine the
percentage of participants who have changed their ranks above a certain threshold. In addition, I
inspect the distributions of the absolute rank change to get a sense of the magnitudes.
Table D2 reports the percentage of participants who experienced an absolute rank change bigger
than 4 (i.e., a change that move them outside a decile of ranks centered around their own rank) and
the mean and the maximum rank change. The Table indicates that at least 53% of participants
changed their absolute relative rank by more than 4 ranks. In addition, the average participant
experienced an absolute rank change bigger than 6 ranks between any two tests.
Next, I investigate the di®erent sources of noise that may create rank changes. There are three
obvious such sources that usually play a role in testing: having a good/bad day, getting \lucky"
with some test-questions, and guessing. Given the experimental design and the coding speed test,
it seems that only guessing is likely to create noise that may lead to rank changes. Speci¯cally, the
experiment lasted for less than hour. Therefore, participants who were having a good or a bad day
would have had it throughout the experiment. In tests that measure knowledge, a possible source of
noise is the speci¯c questions asked. In particular, test-takers may get higher scores on a particular
test since some of its questions relate to a ¯rsthand knowledge they have.59 However, as all the
coding speed questions require identical knowledge (recognize words and numbers), this source
cannot operate here. Thus, the only source left is guessing. To create a measure of rank change
taking away the random component introduced by guessing, I use the average number of questions
correctly solved in the 30-second periods before the ¯rst guess.60 To make the resulting scores
comparable to the original ones, I assume that participants, had they not been guessing, would
have had this average performance throughout the test, i.e., for twenty 30-second periods. This
assumption means that test-taking motivation has no e®ect on subjects' boredom and fatigue as
the test progresses. However, psychologists investigating motivation claim that lack of motivation
causes boredom and fatigue that increase in the task's length (Revelle, 1993). To further ensure
compatibility of the resulting scores, I truncate the test scores at 140 and allow them to take only
integer values. Ranks are assigned given this constructed set of total test scores as before.
Table D2 reports the percentage of participants who experienced an absolute rank change
bigger than 4 and its mean and maximum. Even once the guesses are taken out at least 48.5% of
participants changed their absolute relative ranking by more than 4 ranks. The average participant
experienced an absolute rank change bigger than 5 between any two tests. The distributions of the
absolute rank change reported in the two panels are not statistically di®erent (Mann-Whitney tests
yield p = 0.33 for the absolute rank change between the $10 and incentives tests and p = 0.97 for
the absolute rank change between the practice and $10 tests). Thus, the change in ranks between
59For example, if a test taker spent the summer in England, she may know that London is its capital, even though
she may not be able answer any other question regarding capitals of other countries.
60As was mentioned above, for two participants it is impossible to construct this measure of performance.
50the di®erent tests does stem from random error associated with guessing.
Next I use simulations to investigate whether the rank change reported above stem from another
source of noise. Speci¯cally, I simulate, for a given test, potential total scores and relative ranking
for each participant, and investigate whether noise can explain changes in the simulated ranks
between tests. Here some cautious is warranted. First, the division of the tests to 30-second
periods itself creates noise. Even if all participants solved the test at a constant pace, this pace
does not necessarily coincide with the 30-second periods. Therefore, to reduce this measurement
error, I examine 1-minute and 2-minute periods. Second, we want to distinguish possible noise
from lack of test-taking motivation. The latter may explain rank change within the ¯rst two tests.
However, lack of test-taking motivation should not explain rank change within the incentives test.61
Therefore, I restrict attention to rank change implied by participants' actions in the incentives test,
to test whether the rank change reported above could stem from this particular noise. As long as
the noise generating process is the same in all the tests (or that the noise is the most detrimental
to scores in the incentives test) this can serve as an upper bound for the e®ects of noise.
To simulate the rank change within the incentives test, for each participant I re-sample twice
from the periods before her ¯rst guess. To reduce the measurement error, I re-sample either ten
1-minute periods or ¯ve 2-minutes periods. I add the number of correct answers in each period to
construct two sets of test scores for each participant. I then construct two sets of relative ranking,
where the highest scores are ranked 1, the second highest test scores are ranked 2, etc, and compute
the absolute rank change between these two sets of scores. To compare to the rank change between
the practice and $10 tests, and the $10 and incentives tests, I repeat the process above now drawing
also from the practice and the $10 tests. I then repeat the whole procedure 10,000 times. Figure
D2 depicts the CDF's of absolute rank change obtained from these simulations. It is clear from
the ¯gures that the amount of rank change between the tests is much higher than the amount of
rank changes within the incentives test. To quantify this, I calculate the fraction of absolute rank
change that is bigger than x, where x = 1,2..., for each simulation, and calculate the percentage of
simulations in which this fraction was bigger within the incentives test than between any two tests.
For the 1-minute periods simulations, the fraction of absolute rank change bigger than one is bigger
within the incentives test than between the tests in at most 6% of simulations. The percentage is
reduced to less than 1% when looking at fraction of absolute rank changes bigger than three. For
2-minute periods the simulations, this fraction is less than 1% already when looking at absolute
rank changes bigger or equal to one. While the simulations suggest that some rank change occurs
within the incentives test, the magnitudes are signi¯cantly smaller than the rank changes between
the $10 and incentives tests and between the practice and $10 tests. Therefore it seems likely that
the rank change between the tests cannot be attributed to noise.
61Although, one needs to keep in mind that if participants started guessing after periods in which their pace fell,
not all time periods are interchangeable. This may create additional rank change even within the incentives test.
51Table D2: Change in Relative Ranking Between Tests Using Total Test Scores
Panel A: Using Total Test Scores
2
% Participant that Changed Mean Absolute Maximum Absolute Observations
Ranking by more than 4 Rank Change Rank Change
Between Incentives Test and
$10 Test 54.5 6.04 25 99
Practice Test 53.5 6.38 32 99
Between $10 Test and
Practice Test 58.6 6.9 31 99
Panel B: Using Test Scores based on Participants' Average Performance Before they Started Guessing
3
% Participant that Changed Mean Absolute Maximum Absolute Observations
Ranking by more than 4 Rank Change Rank Change
Between Incentives Test and
$10 Test 48.5 5.45 21 97
Practice Test 62.2 6.62 28 98
Between $10 Test and
Practice Test 62.2 6.66 28 97
Notes:
1. Highest rank is 1. All individuals with the highest test scores were assigned rank of 1, all the individuals with
the second to highest test scores were assigned rank 2, etc.
2. For the practice test the test scores varies from 14 to 140, the ranks between 1 and 51. For the $10 test the
test scores varies from 21 to 140, the ranks between 1 and 56. For the incentives test the test scores varies
from 73 to 140, the ranks between 1 and 49.
3. The test scores were constructed using the 30-second periods before participants' ¯rst guess, see text for details.
The maximum ranks are 46 for the practice test, 53 for the $10 test, and 49 for the incentives test.
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Figure D2: CDFs of Absolute Rank Change Simulation Results (see text for details).
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